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2	OPETOE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MOTALS AND HEADINGS
3	OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS AND HEARINGS
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5	In the Matter of the
б	PUBLIC MEETING OF THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD
7	NEW TORK CITT CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD
8	Re: The Subject of Land of "Doing Business Contributions" - Fourth Hearing
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11	April 18, 2006 10:00 a.m.
12	40 Rector Street
13	New York, New York
14	BEFORE:
15	FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR., Chairman
16	NICOLE A. GORDON, Executive Director
17	JOSEPH POTASNIK KATHERYN C. PATTERSON
18	Sabine Faustin,
19	Court Reporter
20	PAUL BECKER, C.S.R., P.C.
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2	APPEARANCES:
3	MARLA SIMPSON,
4	Director, Mayor's Office of Contract Services
5	DAVID KARNOVSKY, General Counsel,
6	Mayor's Office of City Planning TERI MATHEWS,
7	Counsel, Deputy Mayor of Administration
8	FRAN REITER, Former Deputer Mayor,
	Giuliani Administration,
9	Reiter/Begun Association SUZANNE NOVAK,
10	Deputy Director,
11	Democracy Project Brennan Center for Justice
12	DOUG ISRAEL, Advocacy Director,
12	Citizen's Union Foundation
13	BARRY POPIK, 2005 Candidate for Manhattan
14	Borough President
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3	PROCEEDINGS
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5	MR. SCHWARTZ: So good morning and
6	welcome all of you. This is our fourth
7	hearing on the subject of candidates
8	accepting contributions from those who "do
9	business with the City".
10	We've been holding these hearings to
11	examine the issue of the appearance and
12	reality of influence peddling in City
13	politics.
14	Our first three hearings last year
15	explored the broad subject of pay to play
16	politics, with witnesses providing
17	testimony on the scope of the problem and
18	the potential for and types of future
19	regulation; the contract's process, data
20	maintained on contracts; lobbyists; data on
21	lobbyists and the processes surrounding the
22	approval of land use franchises,
23	concessions, revocable consents and
24	licenses.
25	On that subject, at the hearing we

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2	held last year, the government witness who
3	was scheduled to come didn't appear and you
4	are here, all three of you, as the
5	government witnesses on the subject.
6	Now, we've gotten testimony from a
7	very wide range of organizations, the
8	this administration, the City
9	administration, the SEC, US SEC, present
10	and former officials and a number of civic
11	groups located in the city and elsewhere.
12	Recently, the administration has
13	developed has made some progress in
14	developing, although it's not completed,
15	databases that help determine who is doing
16	business with the City in connection with
17	contracts and lobbyists.
18	That, particularly as it keeps
19	going, will at least permit disclosure and
20	maybe, as legislation moving through the
21	City Council now suggests, will permit
22	legislation at some legislation on the
23	subject of lobbyist.
24	Now, many observers in our prior
25	hearings and frankly this is a view that

2	I personally share believe that the
3	biggest risk to the City, in terms of both
4	the appearance and the reality of undue
5	influences, is with respect to land use,
6	using that term broadly.
7	The magnitude of land use the valu

The magnitude of land use, the value of land use, does create temptations, either for actual impropriety or for the appearance of impropriety, as people give large donations.

So we look forward to comments from you three City witnesses, and from the other people who are coming later, on how one might be able to address the subject of land use and political donations; whether there are reasonable lines between -- by way of size where you could say something below a certain size, you know, just isn't sufficiently likely to give rise to an improper contribution, to make it worthwhile to burden the system with a regulation.

There may be other issues, like do people who are for-profit get treated

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2	differently than people who are
3	not-for-profit; that may not be an issue
4	that arises quite so much in land use,
5	although it could arise in land use because
6	non-profits do often seek permits from the
7	City.
8	So in any event, we do appreciate
9	all three of you coming. I, personally,
10	know all three of you from work you've done
11	and your representations have continued to
12	be excellent.
13	So anyway, proceed as you plan.
14	MS. SIMPSON: Good morning, Chairman
15	Schwartz and Board members. My name is
16	Marla Simpson and I am the Director of the
17	Mayor's Office of Contract Services (MOCS),
18	and in that capacity, the City's Chief
19	Procurement Officer.
20	With me today, as you know, are
21	David Karnovsky, the General Counsel of the
22	Department of City Planning and Teri
23	Mathews, Counsel to Deputy Mayor for
24	Administration.
25	Mr. Karnovsky will address the land

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2	use process and if there are additional
3	questions concerning licenses, Ms. Mathews
4	is available to answer those. Thank you
5	for the opportunity to testify.
6	Under Executive Order 48 of 2004,
7	and its predecessors, I serve as the
8	Mayor's designee to exercise his oversight
9	and approval authority in the procurement
10	world, as defined in the City Charter and
11	in local laws and the rules of Procurement
12	Policy Board.
13	In that role, as you know, my staff
14	and I, approve a wide array of draft
15	solicitations and proposed contract awards.
16	We have oversight of more than 40 Mayoral
17	agencies that are governed by the laws and
18	regulations that I mentioned.
19	In the areas where we do not review
20	individual awards, which are mainly in the
21	competitive sealed bid arena, we
22	nonetheless exercise substantial, large
23	scale oversight responsibility.
24	One aspect of the process that's
25	mandated by the DDR rules is a

2	determination that agencies need to make
3	that the vendors that they choose to do
4	business are responsible.
5	As part of that process, the
6	responsibility determination, agencies are
7	required to consult with the City's data
8	base, which is known colloquially as
9	VENDEX; that data base is a creature and
10	requirement of Section 6-116.2 of the New
11	York City Ad Code.
12	And the administrative code
13	requires, not only that we collect the data
14	concerning vendor integrity and financial
15	capability and performance, but that we
16	make that data publicly available.
17	The data base contains data on every
18	City contractor and subcontractor receiving
19	awards in excess of \$100,000 on a
20	cumulative, annual basis.
21	My office administers the system and
22	under the statute, we share policy
23	oversight for the system with the City
24	Comptroller.
25	There is, as I mentioned, a public

2	access center that allows walk up viewing
3	of the actual VENDEX records during
4	business hours and, as you know, in our
5	effort to improve public access during this
6	administration, we have made some
7	technological advances aimed at increasing
8	the transparency of that data for the
9	public.
10	One of those initiatives, the "Doing
11	Business Searcheable Data Base," was
12	developed last year in partnership with the
13	Board, as a tool of to implement the
14	1998 Charter Amendment that we're
15	discussing today, concerning regulations
16	that govern campaign contributions from
17	those who do business with the City; that
18	data base is located on nyc.gov at
19	html/bizsearch.
20	In addition, again, as you know, the
21	lobbyist information was added more

In addition, again, as you know, the lobbyist information was added more recently and is also publicly searchable at that location. The public may search those records both by the name of the company, and by the last name of the top three principals,

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3	the individuals which are typically the Chief
4	Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
5	Chief Operating Officer, Board Chair or
6	positions like that.
7	Our focus last year with the Board
8	in our discussions was on procurement, but
9	under the same Executive Order, as Director
10	of the Mayor's Office of Contract Services,
11	I exercise parallel oversight
12	responsibility for the Mayor's approval
13	authority of franchises, concessions, and
14	revocable consents.
15	I've brought copies today with me of
16	our FY 2005, annual report, and my staff
17	will leave them with you, and you'll see on
18	Page 15 of that report, we there's a
19	section that actually details, on a
20	citywide basis, the annual volume of what
21	we approve in that area.
22	By way of example, the franchise
23	docket today includes the City's recently
24	announced Street Furniture Award and our

concession docket includes such items as

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2	the anything from a small food cart at
3	the Parks Department to the recently
4	approved Randalls Islands water park or
5	some of the large scale marketing
6	initiatives sponsored by the City's
7	marketing development corporation.
8	All franchises, regardless of value,
9	and all significant concessions, which are
10	those that are valued in excess of
11	\$100,000, are already subject to the VENDEX
12	filing requirements under the Ad Code, and
13	so we collect the same data on those
14	companies and on their principals as we
15	do
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: You say all
17	franchises regardless of value, so if it's
18	a franchise for a push cart or a newsstand
19	or something like that, that comes
20	within
21	MS. SIMPSON: There aren't any
22	franchises for those. A franchise
23	sometimes the issue with a franchise is
24	that it's actually very difficult to assign
25	a particular value to it

2	But for example, franchises include
3	cable television, a number of information
4	technology/telecommunications permits that
5	the City grants; in effect, use of the
6	street beds and construction on sidewalks,
7	which is why you get the street furniture,
8	bus shelter issues.
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: If you were trying to
10	devise something that drew a line based
11	on you know if let's take, even
12	though it's a concession, a newsstand, you
13	know, it's not very likely that someone is
14	going to be going around making
15	contributions, so they're more likely to
16	get a concession permit for having a
17	newsstand
18	MS. GORDON: Well, first
19	MS. SIMPSON: The statute does draw
20	that line, that's what I'm trying to say.
21	MR. SCHWARTZ: But I'm wondering,
22	you draw the line at \$100,000
23	MS. SIMPSON: Correct, yes. With
24	franchise, I think the idea is that the
25	effect on the land use is significant

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2	enough; they're often citywide, sometimes
3	they're borough wide; we had, for example,
4	many bus route franchises.
5	The statute draws the line there,
6	and says "all franchises", but for
7	concessions we follow the same process that
8	we follow in the contract world, which is
9	\$100,000 annual revenue and up
10	MR. SCHWARTZ: If we were to ask you
11	to do a chart that would say how many there
12	are I'm lumping franchises and
13	concessions together here, but where
14	there
15	MS. GORDON: Can we get copies of
16	those.
17	MR. SCHWARTZ: (Continuing) where
18	the value is between one hundred and
19	\$500,000 between five hundred and a million
20	and between \$1 million and \$5 million.
21	MS. SIMPSON: I don't think it's
22	possible to characterize franchises that
23	way, but as you will see in the universe
24	that was done in fiscal 2005, the section
25	heging I guess on Dage 15 of the ghart

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2	there were twelve citywide franchises.
3	Most of them they were split
4	between the Department of Transportation
5	and the Department of Information
6	Technology, and it's actually then misleading
7	in terms of the count, because my
8	recollection of the ones from DOITT are
9	the I don't believe any of the FYO5 ones
10	were new franchises.
11	In most cases what DOITT brings to
12	our office for approval is change of
13	control requests. So when a
14	telecommunications company is taken over by
15	another one, the franchise needs to be
16	moved from Company A to Company B, but it's
17	the same franchise.
18	So citywide in all of fiscal '05,
19	there were twelve. Whereas for concessions
20	you're looking at a much larger universe.
21	In general, you'll see that we did a
22	total of 229 concessions of which only 27
23	of them were approved by the FCRC. Now,
24	that is not I can give you examples of
25	the colit between \$100 000 above and below

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2	Certainly all 27 that went to the
3	Franchising Concession Board were above
4	\$100,000, and that's one of the reasons why
5	they went there.
6	Within the 229, there probably are
7	several others that exceed 100,000 in
8	annual volume and they're in there,
9	although on an individual basis they didn't
10	require FCRC approval; but it's relatively
11	easy.
12	I guess the point I was leading up
13	to is that because the database has already
14	been made available through the Doing
15	Business Search, you already have it.
16	Everything on the franchise and
17	concession awards is already in the
18	searchable data base. There's no
19	additional no additional development
20	would be needed for that, because the
21	franchise and concession holders are
22	treated identically to the vendors in the
23	procurement world, and when we made that

available on the searchable public data

base, they came with it. So you already

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2	have them.
3	MS. PATTERSON: What is the bidding
4	process for franchises and concessions?
5	MS. SIMPSON: It's somewhat similar.
6	The rules are very similar to the PPB
7	rules. There are some that are done by
8	competitive, sealed bid; I would say that's
9	a smaller proportion than exists in the
10	procurement world.
11	More typically, it's a request for
12	proposal RFP process, and again the
13	evaluation rules are very similar to what
14	you find in procurement, and then for
15	concessions there is an ability to also use
16	a process that is called "Other", but tends
17	to be either sole source, because there
18	really is only one company that could
19	provide it or only one company that has
20	access to the particular parcel of land on
21	which the snack shop could be set up.
22	And so there are you know, there

And so there are -- you know, there are processes that exist for approving those items separate from a competitive process.

2	MS. PATTERSON: Okay, and let's say
3	you go through an RFP process with a
4	franchise. Are there a minimum number of
5	bids that need to be obtained or do you
6	just put out the City puts out the RFP
7	and if only one possible provider comes in,
8	you simply evaluate the merits of that
9	proposal?
10	MS. SIMPSON: You could. Right, you
11	could, and obviously you wouldn't be
12	obligated to select that provider. We
13	always reserve an opportunity to make no
14	award, if that is in the best interest of
15	the City.
16	Again, not all of the information
17	has been released publicly but the best
18	example that's on the public awareness now
19	is the Street Furniture Franchise that was
20	by DOT, a very complex RFP process.
21	The City has obviously made an
22	announcement of the tentative awardee, and
23	we are very close to beginning the
24	Franchise and Concession Committee process

25 that will evaluate that selection.

2	Once we do that, we would make
3	public to the members of the Board,
4	obviously, who the competitors all were and
5	how they scored; that element is not yet
6	public.
7	MS. PATTERSON: So then, take us very
8	simplistically through the public process,
9	if you have a franchise or a possible
10	franchise that the City is going to give some
11	value I mean, and by definition
12	virtually all of these franchises are of
13	value but how does it start; how does it
14	finish; what are the operative steps and
15	who gets involved?
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: Yeah.
17	MS. SIMPSON: There are a number of
18	agencies that typically I mean, I guess
19	one can imagine circumstances where an
20	agency that hadn't done a franchise would
21	suddenly be in a position to do one, but by
22	and large you'll see that the franchise
23	world is pretty much the Department of
24	Transportation because of the control of
25	the streets, and the Department of

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2	Information Technology, and so that's
3	basically the two agencies that do it.
4	They would, under just to be
5	clear, there are no regulations that are
6	currently on the books, on franchises. The
7	entire franchise approval process is
8	spelled out in the Charter. So it's
9	relatively simple and straightforward in
10	the Chapter 14 of the Charter.
11	The agency can solicit a proposal
12	for a franchise and then, basically, is
13	obligated to provide fair treatment for the

obligated to provide fair treatment for the proposers.

Under the Executive Order, that governs my office, the Mayor has delegated sort of a regulation of that process to us, because this is very, very analogous to what we do in the procurement world, and we work closely with the agencies, both to structure their solicitations and their evaluation process, and then once they come into the process, in effect, they make a filing with our office to be administer the docket of the FCRC, the agency comes to us

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2	to be on the docket for possible approval.
3	We review all of their documents
4	before putting presenting them to the
5	FCRC, and at the end of the process, it's
6	our obligation to certify, on behalf of the
7	Mayor, that all of the procedural rules
8	were complied with.
9	MS. PATTERSON: What are the
10	criteria applied for the award of a
11	successful franchise, then?
12	MS. SIMPSON: The major I mean,
13	they're generally are awarded, again, in
14	much the same way as a contract is.
15	Typically, the requirement is to evaluate
16	technical merit, which will come into, you
17	know, sort of the expertise of the
18	organization, the experience, the track
19	record, all of those things.
20	A second factor would be financial
21	capability which is obviously going to be
22	looked at in all situations where revenue
23	is being promised to the City because we
24	need those promises to be real.
25	A major difference that applies

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2	then, that somewhat distinguishes this from
3	the approval process for contracts, is that
4	generally in the franchise and concession
5	arena, the revenue is actually part of the
6	scoring; whereas in contracts, the vendors
7	are evaluated on technical merit and then
8	price is considered at the tail end of that
9	process, in some in a separate manner;
10	whereas, with franchise and concessions
11	it's actually built into the score.
12	MS. PATTERSON: It makes sense,
13	because in effect it's a pricing
14	formulation.
15	MS. SIMPSON: Correct.
16	MS. PATTERSON: But if there are no
17	regulations, are there other guidelines or
18	directives that exist that can be looked
19	at?
20	MS. SIMPSON: Not at present. The
21	system has worked and has worked reasonably
22	well all these years, just operating. I
23	mean again, one of the reasons why there aren't
24	regulations on franchises is that the
25	Charter provisions are quite specific;

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2	whereas, if you look at the parallel
3	Charter provisions on concessions, they are
4	more general and actually direct the
5	promulgation of rules, and so obviously
6	rules are done
7	MS. GORDON: I just wonder on things
8	like scoring and all of that, maybe that's
9	in the Charter I'm not familiar with all
10	of the provisions but I'm just curious
11	whether there is anything else in writing.
12	Are you the quality assurance, so to
13	speak, that means if more than one agency is
14	doing it, it's done the same way or is
15	it not done the same way or, that's why
16	MS. SIMPSON: Those are policy
17	judgments that I guess every administration
18	makes for itself. We do not we are the
19	quality control agency, that's clear but we
20	do not insist on identical criteria or
21	identical approaches from agency to agency.
22	You will see differences and I'll
23	give one we're about to reach a level
24	where I don't want to speak
25	extemporaneously I'd need to get back to

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2	it but for example, in the arena that
3	DOITT does franchises, they are heavily
4	regulated by the Federal Government.
5	So that what they are able to do in
6	regulating or evaluating or theoretically
7	turning down franchises is quite
8	circumscribed because the City's authority
9	in that area is preempted in many ways by
10	the Federal Government.
11	So what we look at on a DOITT
12	franchise will in fact be somewhat
13	different than what we look at in the area
14	of DOT, which has control of the sidewalks
15	and streets, and is soliciting proposals
16	for a major revenue and franchise that
17	would govern bus shelters and public
18	toilets.
19	We have a great deal more the
20	City has a great deal more discretion on
21	what we would do, so we don't insist on a
22	one size fits all
23	MS. GORDON: What about the things
24	like structure. I assume there's an
25	internal agency Committee that's going to

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2	evaluate, or some Committee is set up to
3	evaluate the different proposals?
4	Are there any guidelines or
5	expectations about how that will be
6	peopled?
7	MS. SIMPSON: There are no
8	directives written or otherwise that govern
9	that. I think that everyone in the process
10	understands it to be governed by the same
11	principals as State law and contract, you
12	know, and also the provisions that are
13	mentioned in the Charter.
14	I mean, you're basically looking to
15	ensure fairness, equal access and, you
16	know, the integrity of the process and
17	equal treatment of the various competitors;
18	and those are the principals that are
19	spelled out and I think everyone
20	understands what that is.
21	Now, I'm not saying in the future,
22	we might not develop guidelines. Obviously
23	if we develop guidelines or rules, we'll
24	make that publicly available, we would have
25	a cap on the process and there would be

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2	wide notice of the existence of that.
3	My office's involvement in the as
4	it affects the quality assurance component
5	of this process is relatively recent; we
6	assumed that role in last two years.
7	MS. GORDON: Do you sit on the or
8	does someone from your office sit on the
9	review of the agency?
10	MS. SIMPSON: No, my office is in
11	effect the Clerk or Administrator for the
12	FCRC Committee.
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: And can you state,
14	Marla, what the membership of the FCRC is;
15	who appoints them, like their terms.
16	MS. SIMPSON: Certainly. They all
17	serve at the pleasure of their appointing
18	official. The FCRC is a six member board.
19	It is comprised of the Mayor, as Chair of
20	the Board, another appointee of the office
21	of the Mayor, the Corporation Counsel, the
22	Office of Management and Budget, that's
23	four, the comptroller with a whole vote,
24	and the five Borough Presidents share in

one vote.

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2	MR. SCHWARTZ: They do that by
3	choosing one of themselves or do they each
4	have one fifth of a vote?
5	MS. SIMPSON: Generally speaking,
6	what it rotates by where the physical
7	location of the item is, and when it is a
8	citywide item, generally they work by
9	agreement, where they can designate one to
10	cast the vote.
11	MS. PATTERSON: So in essence, what
12	it sounds like, is the FCRC, and it sounds
13	like the entire approval process, from the
14	point where the RFP goes out, to where the
15	bid comes in, to where the FCRC takes a
16	look at it, to ultimately where you have
17	the Mayor and his designee, and the
18	Comptroller and his designee, in one case
19	approve and the other case register, that's
20	all what I would describe as an Executive
21	branch function?
22	MS. SIMPSON: Basically, yes.
23	MS. PATTERSON: So we don't have,
24	let's say, City Council involved in it?

MS. SIMPSON: The City Council is

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2	involved in the land use process, which Mr.
3	Karnovsky can talk about, in the resolution
4	that establishes the franchise, but that
5	resolution does not select any particular
6	operator of that franchise.
7	MS. PATTERSON: How carefully
8	tailored is the resolution so that there
9	may be only one operator of that franchise?
10	MS. SIMPSON: I think it would not
11	be.
12	MR. SCHWARTZ: So that the City
13	Council has would have, at least in
14	theory, an oversight role over the award of
15	franchises. Do they exercise any oversight
16	on it?
17	MS. PATTERSON: Not really, no.
18	They don't really have it
19	MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, they can hold
20	hearings on anything they want to.
21	MS. SIMPSON: They can hold hearings
22	on anything they want to. In the two years
23	that I have been involved in this process,
24	I've been called on the City Council many
25	times, but not on the issue of franchise

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2	and concessions.
3	MS. GORDON: Is there a history,
4	just in general way has there been, more
5	or less unanimous consent among the members
6	of the FCRC or is it sometimes split?
7	MS. SIMPSON: There are occasional
8	dissents. I would say that unanimous
9	adoption is the far and away more prevalent
10	results.
11	With franchises' approval requires
12	five votes, so the six member body cannot
13	act without a non-Mayoral supporter. With
14	concessions, the approval requires only
15	four votes but I would say that the
16	typical, um, you know way in excess of 90
17	percent of them or done unanimously.
18	MS. GORDON: And do the Borough
19	Presidents, do they ever vote with a do
20	they ever speak with more than one voice;
21	do they ever have a three fifths
22	MS. SIMPSON: Again, I would have to
23	get back to you about the "ever" but in my
24	experience with it, no, that has not

happened.

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2	MR. SCHWARTZ: So would it, in your
3	judgment follow that on this subject the
4	if there is a concern about the appearance
5	of undue influence, it would be with
6	respect to the office of the Mayor
7	primarily, but also conceivably with the
8	Office of the Comptroller and the office of
9	the relevant Borough President?
10	MS. SIMPSON: Those would all be
11	parties to whom in fact in my
12	experience, when there have been private
13	applicants before the FCRC, they have met
14	with the members of the Board.
15	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay, so do we have
16	any more questions about the franchising
17	and concession review process?
18	MS. GORDON: Yeah, just one on the
19	commission itself.
20	Is there an easily available public
21	record of the votes that have been taken on
22	particular approvals?
23	MS. SIMPSON: Um, the those
24	records are maintained in my office and

they are publicly available. I don't know

Τ	
2	that they're posted anywhere but we've
3	certainly gotten requests that we've always
4	complied with, you know copies of the
5	resolution are made
6	MS. GORDON: No, I'm just following
7	up on this other issue about you know,
8	where, if anywhere in the system, is there
9	the overlap between possible numbers
10	nobody is saying there is or has been
11	necessarily, but just spots where there's
12	an overlap between the issue of
13	contributions and awards.
14	MS. SIMPSON: Well, as I say, the
15	principal way in which you would, I assume,
16	research that would be by looking at who
17	the applicants are and that's in the
18	database that has been provided, and that's
19	there.
20	MS. GORDON: Now, you were talking
21	earlier I think that you said that the
22	franchises are a five require five
23	votes?
24	MS. SIMPSON: Correct.
25	MS. GORDON: The concessions do not?

1	
2	MS. SIMPSON: That's correct.
3	MS. GORDON: And so
4	MR. SCHWARTZ: So the significance
5	of that five votes and the brilliance of
6	the people who devised the Charter was that
7	the Mayor's office alone couldn't decide
8	MS. GORDON: Right, but something
9	like a Parks Deparment concession could be
10	decided without the Mayor's office
11	MS. PATTERSON: No, I think it's the
12	other way around
13	MS. SIMPSON: Yes, but actually let
14	me make another point on the Parks
15	Department, on those type of concessions.
16	Typically, particularly if you're talking
17	about the food concessions awards, those
18	are almost entirely awarded on competitive
19	processes, either bids, in the case of food
20	cart or a RFP, in the case of, you know,
21	say a restaurant, and while the Franchise
22	Concession Review Committee this is
23	where I might have a question about the
24	Charter the Franchise and Concession

Review Committee is directed to hold a

1	
2	hearing on the competitive hearings, some
3	of which are quite large, but it has no
4	power.
5	The awards occur once the public
6	hearing has happened, the agency may
7	complete it's award process, and the only
8	certification required on the competitive
9	concession is my offices's certification
10	that the procedural requirements were met
11	and then the Comptrollers approval of the
12	registration.
13	MS. PATTERSON: So in essence, I
14	think it's the other way around, as I
15	understood it. A franchise in order for
16	an application of a franchise to get the
17	franchise, that applicant needs the
18	approval of the Mayor's office?
19	MS. SIMPSON: And of at least one
20	non-Mayoral
21	MS. PATTERSON: And of at least one
22	non-Mayoral appointee, which could be Corp.
23	Counsel
24	MS. SIMPSON: No, no, no. It has to
25	be one of the two elected officials.

1	
2	MS. PATTERSON: So the Comptroller
3	or the Borough President?
4	MS. SIMPSON: Correct.
5	MS. PATTERSON: And for concessions,
6	those can be awarded without the approval
7	of the Mayor's office, if they were also
8	you had the Comptroller and the Borough
9	President and I'm a little
10	MS. SIMPSON: I guess it all depends
11	on the semantics.
12	MS. PATTERSON: Who has the veto in
13	each case, that's all I'm really trying to
14	get at?
15	MS. SIMPSON: The Corporation
16	Counsel and the Office of Management
17	Budget, again, I think I can safely say,
18	have never voted differently than the
19	office of the Mayor and the Mayor, in the
20	history of the FCRC.
21	So with a concession, the award
22	could happen without any non-Mayoral
23	elected's approval, and indeed which is
24	the point I was just making most
25	competitive concessions are awarded without

1	
2	the formal vote of the FCRC at all, and so
3	then, the only approvals that a competitive
4	award would receive, would be the approval
5	of my office that the procedural rules were
6	followed and the approval under the Charter
7	that the comptroller exercises as part of
8	registration.
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: Marla, you said, when
10	I asked you whether the Council did oversight
11	on the franchise's sector, you said you had
12	never been up there on that subject, but
13	you have been to the Council on oversight
14	hearings on
15	MS. SIMPSON: Contracts. Contracts,
16	regularly.
17	MR. SCHWARTZ: Even though today
18	we're not really talking much about
19	contracts, what do they bring you in to
20	talk about, when it's a, I presume, a
21	non-bid contract?
22	What kinds of questions do they ask
23	you?
24	What's the nature of their
25	oversight?

2	MS. SIMPSON: Generally about the
3	process. I would say, for example, in
4	Human Services arena, issues come up about
5	the timeliness of awards and the process
6	that's used; whether a particular
7	solicitation that is on the street, that
8	might represent a major change in the
9	program, they may have policy issues with
10	that.
11	They have asked many questions about
12	the Vendor Integrity Review Process, the
13	actual since VENDEX is a creature of the
14	Ad Code, they have had questions on
15	administration and the process by which we
16	collect data under VENDEX.
17	I've had there have been
18	hearings a substantial number of
19	hearings about the minority and women owned
20	business initiatives that would be an area
21	recently that Council also became involved
22	in; environmentally preferable purchasing,
23	and passed a number of bills that the Mayor
24	signed on that.

25 It's a rare example -- and obviously

1	
2	we're very cognizant of this as a key
3	element of the Charter structure it's
4	very rare in a Council oversight hearing
5	for a question to come up on an individual
6	contract or an individual vendor, and if it
7	did it would only come up as an example of
8	a particular policy concern, you know, if a
9	particular contractor complained about
10	whether they were treated in accordance
11	with a particular rule.
12	In the hearings that the Council
13	Contract's Committee has held under my
14	tenure, I don't recall them asking
15	questions that are aimed at really
16	selection process, per se.
17	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay.
18	MS. SIMPSON: Okay, if I can just
19	conclude for a moment. The final element
20	that is within the Executive Order and the
21	approval authority of my office are
22	revocable consents.
23	Those tend to be relatively de
24	minimis items, such as the sidewalk cafe's
25	or the hallards that are in the street

1	
2	Our sidewalk data from the revocable
3	consents is not, at this point, contained
4	in the Doing Business Searcheable Data
5	Base, as it falls outside of VENDEX,
6	because if it's of its principal low vendor
7	value, and the Council didn't seek to
8	regulate it in that way, but that
9	information is publicly available, so thank
10	you for your time.
11	MS. PATTERSON: Can I ask you a
12	question that's not exactly in your
13	purview it's more DOITT, but I didn't
14	ask it the last time.
15	When a franchiser contract is
16	awarded, the relevant data goes into
17	VENDEX
18	MS. SIMPSON: Yes.
19	MS. PATTERSON: (Continuing) what
20	kind of updating is required or expected of
21	the provider?
22	MS. SIMPSON: That is very much in
23	my purview. We are the Administrator of
24	the whole VENDEX operation. It is a three
2.5	year statute, and so the VENDEX filing

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Now, if you have a one time award and you're not coming back for a renewal or you're not -- you know, you're not expected to come to the process again, you would not, generally speaking, have to update the VENDEX with.

What the statute requires is that you update it when you have another action pending, if -- under two circumstances, either something has changed, which is to say you could have made a filing yesterday, but if you changed the Chair of the Board today and were asking for a contract tomorrow, you would have to do an update to reflect that change of control.

But generally if nothing changes and you're simply coming in for a new contract or a new franchise, there's a three year rule.

MS. PATTERSON: And if there is no new application; that is, that it's within the contract period, does the vendor or the franchise holder have an affirmative

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2	obligation to inform you if the CEO change;
3	if they get acquired; if the division is
4	sold to someone, anything of that sort?
5	MS. SIMPSON: The contract itself
6	will define certain terms or certain issues
7	as material enough to the relationship that
8	an affirmative obligation is made for the
9	contractor to notify the City of changes.
10	Certainly, issues that relate to the
11	financial control of a corporation will
12	generally fall in that arena and because of
13	that, it will typically result in an
14	updating of VENDEX but those types of
15	material changes are really a function of
16	the business transaction, the actual
17	contract; there's not a one size fits all
18	approach to that.
19	MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Marla.
20	So David, are you next?
21	MR. KARNOVSKY: I am. I'm David
22	Karnovsky, General Counsel to the
23	Department of City Planning. I'm glad to
24	be here today to answer some of questions
25	raised in your March letter with regard to

1	
2	land use.
3	More specifically, I'm going to
4	describe the land use review process a
5	little bit, and describe the information
6	that is maintained by the Department of
7	City Planning with respect to private
8	applicants for land use changes, and I hope
9	also to address some possible
10	misconceptions about the land use process
11	that may be reflected in some of your
12	materials, particularly the
13	characterization of land use approvals as a
14	form of contract with a specified dollar
15	value, and I'll discuss that more in
16	detail.
17	In terms of the land use process in
18	the City of New York, it's important to
19	remember first, that most development in
20	the City of New York takes place on an as
21	of right basis; that is to say, it takes
22	place without the need for any
23	discretionary land use approvals and it is

consistent with existing zoning and

requires only the issuance of a permit by

24

1	
2	the Department of Buildings to that effect.
3	However, when a proposed development
4	requires modification of existing zoning or
5	other provisions, then the owner or
6	developer must go to one or more of several
7	agencies: The Board of Standards and
8	Appeals, the Landmarks Preservation
9	Commission and the City Planning
10	Commission.
11	The Board of Standard and Appeals,
12	of course, with respect to variance and
13	zoning with respect to certain permits.
14	The Landmarks Preservation Commission, with
15	respect to development that affect landmark
16	sites and historic vistas, and City
17	Planning Commission with respect to zoning
18	changes, special permits and other
19	significant changes in land use, which I'll
20	discuss in more detail. Of course, my
21	focus today is on the Department of City
22	Planning and the City Planning Commission,
23	not on those other agencies.

What is the Department and what is

the Commission?

24

2	The Department is a Mayoral agency
3	established under the Charter and then
4	comprised of architects, planners,
5	economists and engineers; it's headed by a
6	director who is appointed and serves at the
7	pleasure of the Mayor and is charged with
8	advising the Mayor and/or elected officials
9	with regard to all manners of issues
10	related to planning, and it also provides
11	staff assistance to the City Planning
12	Commission, in the exercise of its
13	jurisdiction.
14	So what is the City Planning
15	Commission. The City Planning Commission
16	is a 13 member body established under the
17	charter. The Mayor appoints seven members,
18	including the Chair, who is also the
19	Director of the Department, and the six
20	remaining members are appointed one by each
21	of the Borough President and one by the
22	Public Advocate. The members serve for a
23	terms of years, staggered five years terms.
24	The Charter states that the member
25	shall be chosen "For their independence,

2	integrity and civic commitment" and they
3	include people who are engineers, planners,
4	experts in affordable housing and the like.
5	Most relevant for purposes of
6	today's
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: And they have a term
8	of office, right?
9	MR. KARNOVSKY: They do, a term of
10	five years, staggered terms, one of the
11	innovations Charter, 1989.
12	Most relevant for the purpose of
13	today's discussion, the City Planning
14	Commission has a formal decision making
15	role in the City's process for the review
16	of zoning and other major discretionary
17	land use changes, under what is known-as
18	the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure or
19	ULURP.
20	It should be noted that the Planning
21	Commission also reviews a number of items
22	which are not governed by ULURP, but the
23	ULURP applications are the most significant
24	ones on its docket, and I'll focus on them
25	today.

2	The ULURP process is set forth in
3	the Charter, Sections 197(c) and 197(d) and
4	what it does is establishes a multi-layer
5	procedure for the review of certain major
6	categories of land use actions by the
7	community boards and the Borough
8	Presidents, in an advisory capacity, and by
9	the City Planning Commission, and in
10	certain cases, the City Council, acting in
11	a decision making capacity.
12	Now, the land use actions, subject
13	to ULURP, which are most typically sought
14	by private applicants include, for example,
15	designations of the zoning districts, under
16	the zoning resolution; that is,
17	applications to amend the zoning
18	designation for parcels or parcels of land,
19	special permits to authorize modifications
20	to the Zoning Resolution, with respect to
21	use or bulk controls on designated parcels,
22	and changes to the City map; that is,
23	applications to eliminate or modify the
24	configuration of the City's street
25	network in order to accommodate

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2	development.

days.

3	The formal ULURP review process
4	lasts seven months, roughly seven months
5	and it has several layers of review.
6	First, the Community Board reviews the
7	application for a sixty-day period, holds a
8	public hearing, and issues a recommendation
9	to the City Planning Commission and the
10	Borough President with respect to the
11	action.
12	Following the City following the
13	Community Board action, and the Borough
14	President, and if the action involves more
15	than one Community Board, also the Borough
16	Board reviews the application for thirty

They are allowed to but not required to hold a public hearing; their role is also advisory, as I indicated. And then following their review, the City Planning Commission has sixty days to hold a public hearing and thereafter to approve, disapprove or approve of the modifications to the application.

The City Planning Commission

3	disapprovals are final and there is no
4	right of appeal to the City Council.
5	Now with respect to the City
6	Council, the City Council must act on
7	certain items which are legislative in
8	nature or for which its action is required
9	under State law, such as urban renewal
10	plans, these items include, most
11	significantly zoning map changes and zoning
12	text amendments.
13	The Council must also review any
14	other ULURP application not subject to its
15	mandatory jurisdiction, where the Community
16	Board has recommended disapproval; the
17	Borough President has represented
18	disapproval; the Planning Commission has
19	recommended approval or has approved it,
20	better said, and the Borough President
21	wants to trigger review by the City Council
22	and so advises the Council.
23	Finally, the Council also has the
24	ability to call up any item which is not
25	within its mandatory jurisdiction and to

1	
2	review it, and it does so by a majority
3	vote of the body. The Mayor
4	MR. SCHWARTZ: Can you say, just in
5	terms of percentages, how many matters come
6	through the City Planning Commission, are
7	either called up by the Council or get
8	there by the triple no?
9	MR. KARNOVSKY: I don't have a
10	percentage figure but I was looking at some
11	figures yesterday, for example, with
12	respect to special permits, which are not a
13	mandatory item, and I saw that in 2005, The
14	Planning Commission acted on roughly 80
15	such special permits and the Council acted
16	on roughly 15, which give us some
17	indication that not all items are called up
18	by the Council, but I think it is fair to
19	say that any item which represents a
20	significant issue for the local community
21	and the local Council members will be
22	called up.
23	The Mayor has a veto with respect
24	to Council action, which can be overriden
25	by the City Council by a

T	
2	two-thirds vote of the body; that is a very
3	rare occurrence.
4	MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is rare, the
5	Council
6	MR. KARNOVSKY: The Mayoral veto.
7	The Mayoral veto. The Mayoral veto.
8	I want to focus a little bit on the
9	nature of the land use determination that
10	we make, because I think it's relevant to
11	your consideration.
12	The purpose of ULURP is to consider
13	the land use impacts and implications of
14	the proposal. Is what is being proposed
15	appropriate and consistent with sound
16	planning, in terms of what it seeks as a
17	change of use or a change in the allowable
18	density of development or change in the
19	building form or the like.
20	Land use determinations are
21	regulatory actions in the exercise of the
22	police power and are not in any sense
23	contracts between the City and the
24	applicant.
25	The applicant is not competing for a

1	
2	contract, involving expenditure of City
3	monies for goods or services, but is
4	seeking to alter the regulations governing
5	the use of its property.
6	Unlike contracts, which are held by
7	the private party that wins the contract
8	award, land use approvals are not personal
9	to the owner or development who is the
10	applicant, rather they pertain to and run
11	with the land; this means that following
12	our approval, the property may well be sold
13	to other parties who will develop it in
14	accordance with the approvals, and those
15	successor owners are bound by our
16	approvals.
17	The Planning Commission does not and
18	indeed cannot base its condition or land
19	use determination, on the ownership of the
20	property and the identity of the applicant.
21	The fact that zoning is concerned
22	with land use, rather than the person who
23	owns or occupies the land has been

highlighted in a series of Court decisions,

and I just want to mention one because it

24

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2	really	crystallizes	thig	point

Some years ago there was a decision by a local town board which approved a rezoning from a residential classification to a commercial classification, subject to a condition that the change inure to the benefit of named applicant only, and only for its proposed development, which was for a supermarket.

And the Court of Appeals said that this decision reflected a lack of adherence to the fundamental rule that zoning deals basically with land use, and not with the person who owns or occupies it,

"While it is proper for a Zoning
Board to impose appropriate conditions and
safeguards, in conjunction with a change of
zones or a grant of a variance of special
permit, such conditions and safeguards must
be reasonable and relate only to the real
estate involved, without regard to the
person who own and occupies it."

MS. GORDON: But Dave, can I just make a point here. This is not directed at

1	
2	the City Planning Commission or anybody in
3	particular, but I hope you understand that
4	from the point of view of the question that
5	is before the Board about regulating
6	contributions, it's not the question of
7	whether the land you know, whether the
8	approval follows the land, the possible
9	problem is that regardless of what your
10	mandate is, it may well be that in any
11	given case, whoever is the applicant does
12	benefit to a very possibly high degree
13	personally
14	MR. KARNOVSKY: I'm trying I'm
15	making this point in order to get to a
16	discussion about the information we
17	maintain with respect to parties who we do
18	business with, because I want you to
19	understand that our function is not
20	directed at the applicant, the principals
21	of the applicant, the investors of the
22	entity but rather the use of the land and
23	that's why I'm focusing on this. I
24	understand
25	MR. SCHWARTZ: Dave, if the way we

approached the problem was unlike the
contracts, let's say where there is a data
base or unlike the lobbyist where there is
a data base, and live person if the way
we approach the problem was to say the
entity or the owner of the entity who is
seeking the benefit from the change or the
permit being granted, is barred from making
a contribution to certain City officials,
whoever the relevant City officials are
which is the way, by the way, that other
states and the SEC has addressed the issue
of pay to play that wouldn't be hampered
or hindered by the fact that you say you
don't have data on who the concerned people
are.
Now, under the New Jersey system or

Now, under the New Jersey system or the SEC system, the consequence to the person who should have made the contribution is that they lose their right to do business with the City.

So my having said that's a way of looking at the problem, and a method for addressing it, I'd just like you to react

1	
2	to whether such a law because in effect
3	it could only be done by a law creates
4	any significant problems for the way the
5	City does handle land use questions?
6	MR. KARNOVSKY: Speaking from the
7	point of the view of the Department and the
8	Commission, it has no real effect on the
9	way we handle these applications.
10	The point of my focusing on land use
11	and the use of land as the focus of our
12	efforts is really to simply highlight for
13	you that we have relatively limited
14	information available to us, by virtue of
15	the nature of our jurisdiction and I
16	want to discuss what we do maintain, how it
17	could be available and so forth but I
18	think it all starts from the premises, that
19	we are concerned not with the identity of
20	the applicant, nor with the character or
21	integrity of applicant.
22	We don't, for example have VENDEX.
23	We're not concerned with making
24	responsibility determinations, but rather

with whether or not what has been proposed

2	for the use of land is appropriate in terms
3	of comprehensive planning, and that's really
4	why I make the point.
5	Your point what you describe is
6	not something that would affect,
7	materially, the process.
8	MS. PATTERSON: Can I ask a couple
9	of questions?
10	And I certainly understand your
11	point that any restrictions or approvals or
12	grants run with the land; they do not apply
13	to the owner who is the applicant at the
14	particular time that you give your approval
15	or impose a restriction.
16	Um, but if these are in essence
17	restricted easements or permits those, I
18	assume, would be a matter of record if
19	there were to be a search on the particular
20	item property.
21	MR. KARNOVSKY: If you well,
22	there are a couple of things. First of
23	all, our decisions are a matter of public
24	record; our reports are available on the
25	westbound and elsewhere, and in many cases

1	
2	our reports and our actions are accompanied
3	by what are known as Restrictive
4	Declarations, which are covenants that
5	embodied some of the terms of our approval,
6	those are available and accessible on the
7	land use records.
8	MS. PATTERSON: And is there a time
9	gap between when you what is the time
10	gap between when you would impose a
11	restrictive covenant and when it would be
12	available if you did a title search?
13	MR. KARNOVSKY: The covenants have
14	to be recorded as a condition of the
15	issuance, by us, of a letter to the
16	Department of Buildings which authorizes
17	the permits to be issued.
18	MS. PATTERSON: So it would be quite
19	quickly after whatever restricted covenant
20	is issued?
21	MR. KARNOVSKY: I just want to make
22	one point. I'm not sure whether you were
23	saying this in effect, but if you were
24	suggesting, that under the system you
25	described, where it would be illegal to

1	
2	make a donation to an elected official or
3	other party involved in the land use
4	process, that the City Planning Commission
5	could somehow not approve the project, I
6	think that would be troublesome.
7	So I think a question of nexus
8	between what you described and our exercise
9	of land use discretion could be an issue.
10	MS. GORDON: Is there another stage
11	of the process where that happens?
12	I mean, let's just say, totally
13	hypothetically, right, that somebody wants
14	to get some land use application approved,
15	wants to build something that is a
16	known, you know I don't know, someone
17	who has built bad buildings in past,
18	whatever, and gets this approval because
19	it's a good use of the land, let's say, is
20	there some other stage at which the
21	person's history in building buildings
22	would stop that person's ability to go
23	forward with a plan?
24	Are there other permits and so on
25	that come afterwards, that would involve

1	
2	looking at the history of the particular
3	developer, let's say?
4	MR. KARNOVSKY: Not in the way you
5	describe. There are processes that the
6	Department of Buildings and that the State
7	Department of Education, with respect to
8	architects and engineers, and their
9	filings.
10	For example, the Department of
11	Buildings can, under certain circumstances
12	withhold certain privileges, filing
13	privileges for persons who have engaged in
14	what they determine to be a form of
15	misconduct.
16	Likewise architects are licensed by
17	the Department of Education, and from time
18	to time they take action. But in terms of
19	a developer's history of good or bad
20	development and I'm not sure how you
21	would define that no, there is no
22	determination of that kind made by anybody
23	MR. SCHWARTZ: David, I'd like you
24	to put your mind to work on helping us
25	solve the issue which is in front of us.

2	which	we're	charged	to	look	at.

First, we start with history, when there was a Board of Estimate, it was rife with apparent corruption, at least, connected to the size of gifts that were given -- campaign donations that were given to the Board of Estimate at around the time they voted on whether or not to make a land use approval.

Whether there was corruption, or at least apparent corruption with the Board of Estimate, it was particularly focused on their land use decisions.

So the motive that led to people making excessive contributions with Board of Estimate can't have gone away, because there's still enormous value in land use decisions.

So, recognizing the professionalism with which the City Planning Commission approaches issues, and that it's a far better system to have the professionals really driving the train and then the politicians come in, sort of as exceptions

Τ	
2	afterwards; so it's a better system than
3	under the old Board of Estimate.
4	But still the cupidity of potential
5	beneficiaries on these extremely valuable
6	land use decisions, and the desire to make
7	politicians like them by making large
8	contributions still exists.
9	So if one wanted to address that
10	subject through regulation or legislation,
11	what would you suggest would be an appropriate
12	way for doing that, without screwing up the
13	important work that is done, objectively,
14	in the City Planning Commission?
15	MR. KARNOVSKY: You know, I quite
16	frankly did not come today to offer
17	personal views of mine
18	MR. SCHWARTZ: I know you didn't,
19	but you're an intelligent person
20	MR. KARNOVSKY: I am an intelligent
21	person; I will concede to that, but I
22	really came to talk about our process and
23	what information we have to offer; what
24	its value is and what its limitations
25	are.

2	I think all I would say on this is
3	that and you said it before and you said
4	it during the Charter, and this is one of
5	the principles, that guided the Charter
6	revision, that sunshine is very important.
7	At the same time, going back to a
8	comment I made a minute ago, from my point
9	of view, I would be very concerned about a
10	process in which the parties to the land
11	use process could not exercise their
12	discretion by virtue of other requirements
13	that might come into play, in the terms of
14	disclosure
15	MR. SCHWARTZ: You mean the
16	officials who are parties?
17	MR. KARNOVSKY: The officials,
18	correct. For example, if the City Planning
19	Commission was hindered in its ability to
20	consider an application on the land use
21	merits, by virtue of some issue of
22	disclosure or non-disclosure of parties to
23	the ULURP process, that would be of deep
24	concern to me.
25	I think what we have and we're

certainly prepared to share this with the
staff and show them how it works is a
system which records the identity of
applicants, the name of applicants, and
which also records the names of the
applicants's representative, which most
often a law firm, but is sometimes an
architect and an engineer.

And this is all found in the database that we maintain called the LUMI system, the Land Use Management Information system. We use it primarily for internal reasons, to track the progress of applications as they go through the system, but it will show the block and lot and address in question, the applicant's name, it -- sometimes, most often an applicant's representative, the nature of the application, and it will show the entire history on a current basis of application, all the way through to the City Council action or the City Planning Commission action, if that's the last action.

This system is accessible by other

2	City agencies. Current applications, the
3	ones that are pending and active at the
4	Department but have not started ULURP, are
5	actually accessible by the public through
6	our web site, and we intend to make the
7	entire system, with its modifications,
8	available on the web some time in 2007.
9	So this is a useful piece of
10	information. Now there are some
11	limitations, and I just want to discuss
12	those for a minute, so you understand them.
13	Very often, in the land use world,
14	the applicant is a special purpose entity
15	formed for the purpose of developing a
16	particular parcel. Hypothetically, 201
17	East 28th Street LLC.
18	And for our purposes, and because of
19	the nature of our jurisdiction, all we
20	require is that the applicant be the owner
21	of that property and they will name
22	themselves as that LLC.
23	In that circumstance and there
24	are a number of different circumstances, if
25	you look at the system there is nothing

2	to indicate who the parties are that are
3	involved in that LLC, by way of ownership
4	interest or being principals.
5	In other circumstances, however, the
6	names of principals will clearly show up on
7	the system. And so, there are some
8	limitations in terms of its utility as a
9	form of disclosure of who is involved with
10	these applications.
11	But nonetheless, it's a system that
12	exists, it's available and we're glad to
13	discuss it more with you.
14	MS. PATTERSON: Is there any
15	practical or legal maybe legal is the
16	more important question, impediment if the
17	Board were to promulgate regulations that
18	did involve the kinds of contributions that
19	could be made, or if the law were changed
20	in some way that created an obstacle to
21	making contributions if you were a applying
22	for certain things is there any
23	impediment to expanding that data base or
24	having your agency ask for more information
25	than is currently required.

MR. KARNOVSKY: I think there is.
You know, we have a rule making authority
that is a rule making authority to
describe the procedures the application
procedures and the standards for the ULURP
process, and I would understand that to
mean that we're entitled to ask for that
information which is relevant and germane
to our exercise and authority.
A rule which would require the
disclosure of the investors and parties in
interest in the LLC has no bearing on our
jurisdiction, because it's not a basis upon
which we can make a determination.
So I think there are limits to what
we ask, and fundamentally what we ask is
who's the owner, and you have to represent
that you're the owner.
And if you're not the owner, but you
are, for example, a lessee of a long
term under a long term lease, you have
to so state and come in with the owner's

authorization; if you're a contractor

vendee or an option holder, you have to

1	
2	come with the owner's authorization; that
3	is appropriate to our jurisdiction but
4	beyond that I think there are serious
5	questions.
6	MS. GORDON: Where do you think
7	authority would lay to change either your
8	jurisdiction or the law in other ways that
9	would permit asking those additional
10	questions?
11	MR. KARNOVSKY: I haven't analyzed
12	that question. Whether it's a question of
13	State law or local law, I don't know the
14	answer to that.
15	MS. PATTERSON: Does the LUMI data
16	base identify the principal Officers of the
17	SPV that is being used?
18	MR. KARNOVSKY: No, it does not. It
19	just would identify the name of the entity,
20	which is the owner of record.
21	MR. SCHWARTZ: So just let me impose
22	a hypothetical, which I've never heard of
23	happening, but just take as a hypothetical.
24	Suppose the mafia was the owner of
25	the special purpose entity, would the City

2	have no ability to know that, under the
3	current system?
4	MR. KARNOVSKY: Um, under our
5	system, if a principal in an LLC had an
6	organized crime history, we would not know
7	that.
8	MR. SCHWARTZ: So, David, presumably
9	the City Council would have power to pass a
10	law I don't want to conclude that, in
11	asking the question would the City
12	Council have power to pass a law allowing
13	the City Planning Commission to know the
14	principal owners of the corporation that
15	MR. KARNOVSKY: You know, I haven't
16	studied that question. I think one thing
17	to keep in mind is there is a series of
18	issues which would undoubtedly arise, in
19	terms of what the impact of that kind of
20	disclosure is on the process.
21	To the extent that you're dealing
22	with the owner's ability to develop their
23	property, or to seek the opportunity to
24	develop their property and to use it,
25	regulations which interfere with that could

2	raise certain kinds of issues,
3	constitutional issues, and that would be an
4	area that would have to be examined. I
5	don't have an answer to that, but that
6	intersection, I think, is very complicated.
7	MS. PATTERSON: Well, there's also a
8	check because, of course, it doesn't get to
9	the City Planning Commission unless there
10	has already been a hearing at the Community
11	Board level, and the Borough President has
12	reviewed the application and one would hope
13	that since they're more in the trenches than
14	the City Planning Commission, that they
15	would be more capable of doing that degree
16	of due diligence.
17	MS. GORDON: Do they have the right
18	to make any decisions based on the
19	MR. KARNOVSKY: The community boards
20	and the Borough Presidents are acting in an
21	advisory capacity, and their
22	recommendations is supposed to be based on
23	the land use issues raised by the
24	application.
25	MS CORDON: And not the applicant?

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2	MR. KARNOVSKY: Not the applicant.
3	Obviously, applicants and their appear
4	before the community boards the Borough
5	Presidents and the Planning Commission
6	Council. This is a process with ample
7	sunshine and multiple hearings, and in
8	fact, it is a process which has sometimes
9	been criticized as having too many of
10	these hearings
11	MS. GORDON: But the different kind
12	of sunshine that you're talking about; the
13	sunshine is about the use of the land, at
14	least in theory, but not about who is doing
15	a project.
16	But, remember years ago I'm just
17	asking the question you know, years ago,
18	I can't remember the name of the developer
19	right this minute who built the building
20	two stories higher than it was permitted
21	MR. SCHWARTZ: Right, over on 96th
22	Street.
23	MS. GORDON: And let's say that
24	person comes back next time around and
25	wants some permission to do something else,

2	and let's say it's not this guy, but some
3	other guy whose done it six times, violated
4	the terms of the permission, there's no
5	what's the mechanism that stops somebody
6	who has a great plan and it's the right
7	plan for the City, but the execution is
8	not
9	MR. KARNOVSKY: The mechanism is
10	essentially enforcement of zoning by the
11	Department of Buildings
12	MS. GORDON: So you're going to keep
13	going back and saying take your two stories
14	down?
15	MR. KARNOVSKY: In the East 96th
16	Street case, the principal had no estoppel
17	against the City with respect to that type
18	of error by the Department of Buildings in
19	approving permits and it was taken down,
20	but the real answer is enforcement.
21	I will not I don't mean to
22	suggest that when a developer with a poor
23	history comes before the City Planning
24	Commission that its reputation doesn't
25	precede it, but and that the Commission

2	will be very interested in knowing how
3	they're going to develop the property and
4	how they're going to design it and so forth
5	and so on, how they're going to develop
6	it and so on, but the City cannot tie its
7	determination to the use of any particular
8	architect or engineer or things of that
9	nature.
10	MS. GORDON: Or corruption, not even
11	that.
12	MR. POTASNIK: It just appears for
13	purposes of evasion, it's relatively easy
14	to get around whatever restrictions you
15	have.
16	Developers' have friends,
17	developers' have cousins, so if you're
18	looking to somehow regulate the
19	contributions, I don't think it's that
20	difficult to just, you know, run an end run
21	here. It's no matter what you do,
22	there's a counter measure that can easily
23	be realized that will get the person a
24	contribution.
25	So you know the developer. So you

1	
2	know the architect. So what?
3	Those aren't the only people
4	involved in a process.
5	MS. SIMPSON: I would assume the
6	Board faces those issues, though, as well,
7	with though, as well with any contribution
8	limit that you set. Any those same
9	cousins can make multiple donations to
10	exceed a contribution limit in just the
11	same way, which is not a reason not to have
12	a program that would enforce a contribution
13	limit.
14	And law enforcement gets involved in
15	these issues as well, in that obviously,
16	the Buildings Department is the first place
17	where these issues would be addressed, but
18	the DA's are active on violations of
19	building code and those types of issues, as
20	is the Department of Investigation, on
21	occasion.
22	So you see there is enforcement
23	capability of any of these regulations,
24	that would kick in on some of the issues

you mentioned, even if they did not have

1	
2	land use impacts.
3	MS. PATTERSON: I mean, your point
4	is well taken. I think it's inherent in
5	the system. I mean it comes up there's
6	a restriction on corporate contributions
7	which never seem to restrict individuals
8	from the corporations from making
9	inappropriate contributions to individuals,
10	as long as they use the right bank account.
11	MS. SIMPSON: The dollar number.
12	It's the same issue.
13	MS. PATTERSON: It's the same issue.
14	MR. KARNOVSKY: I just want to
15	mention one thing about franchises
16	concessions. Reference was made to land
17	use. Just to be clear about this, there is
18	a limited role with respect to the land use
19	review of certain franchises and
20	concessions.
21	And very simply, if a franchise, RFP
22	is being developed by an agency, and the
23	Planning Department determines that the
24	subject matter of franchise may have land

use impact implications, it must go through

1	
2	a ULURP review.
3	This is all prior to the issuance of
4	the RFP in the competitive process. An
5	example of that was the free furniture
6	franchises back in the 1980's.
7	Likewise, there are certain kinds of
8	concessions, very rare, which go through
9	ULURP, because they're deemed to have land
10	use the potential for land use impacts,
11	and thresholds for that are defined in
12	rules of the Planning Commission.
13	Likewise, if the concession requires
14	an Environmental Impact Statement, it will
15	also go through ULURP; these are also quite
16	rare, but there is an intersection there.
17	We, of course, do not deal with the
18	business terms. We deal with it as an
19	application from the agency, particularly
20	the Parks Department and we look at the
21	land use issues.
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: Any other questions?
23	(No response.)
24	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay, Teri do you
25	have other things to cover?

1	
2	MS. MATHEWS: Well, I think I'm here
3	on a technical capacity, on a very
4	esoterical tail. You asked about licenses.
5	MS. PATTERSON: Right.
6	MS. MATHEWS: A license is a right
7	to use property that isn't a lease, and is
8	not a franchise. And the City can license
9	out which is the franchise and
10	concession world and it can license in.
11	The vast majority of licenses in
12	fact all of concessions, equal license,
13	they may go by different names, but the
14	vast majority of licenses are covered by
15	Marla's world.
16	But there is a small number of
17	licenses that we just wanted to because
18	you did ask for licenses, that are more
19	licenses in, if you want to talk about that
20	distinction, just ask me because I think
21	it's helpful.
22	City agencies often rent property in
23	privately owned buildings those if for
24	different office purposes, warehouse

purposes, other types purposes. Those are

1	
2	all subject to one form of ULURP approval.
3	If it's offices it's 195 of the Charter.
4	If it's not an office, it's 195(c).
5	To get City agencies into property
б	while there is whole process going on, the
7	City often uses a license to get them into
8	a facility, pending ULURP approval and
9	negotiation of a longer term lease.
10	And there is we bring it up in
11	the interest of fair disclosure, but we're
12	talking about a very small number of
13	licenses, the vast majority is with the
14	FCRC, so I'm just here just to, you know
15	for full disclosure?
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: Do you have
17	questions?
18	Do you?
19	(No response.)
20	MR. SCHWARTZ: David, you know, when
21	I asked you the question which in effect
22	said, "Take off your hat and give us your
23	advice," that was probably a little unfair
24	to call upon you to do that in this
25	session.

2	But nonetheless, we're faced with a
3	situation where your ultimate boss, the
4	Mayor of the City of New York, is pushing
5	for certain action; the members of the
6	Board are interested in exploring that
7	action.
8	I can't imagine rationally defending
9	doing something that does not that
10	addresses campaign contributions and
11	doesn't cover land use.
12	So, I guess it seems to me, it
13	given the history and given today's
14	environment, given the economics, there's
15	so much more incentive on the land use side
16	to try to buy influence through political
17	contributions than anywhere else now,
18	whether it's appearance or reality, I can't
19	imagine this Board rationally coming up
20	with a system that touches on, for example
21	contracts, which are interesting but much
22	less likely to involve the same incentives,
23	and not touching land use.
24	So, particularly in light of the
25	fact that it is the Mayor who is pushing

1	
2	very hard for something to be done on
3	campaign contributions, I would love it if
4	you would in a not on the spot in a
5	public hearing put your mind to and
6	the same with you Marla, and the same with
7	you Teri, how one might be able to
8	best be able to address the subject of land
9	use and contributions.
10	You did say disclosure is different
11	from regulations, and that's true, but the
12	issue is are there things beyond
13	disclosure.
14	MS. SIMPSON: I'll offer one
15	observation, since it does intersect with
16	my world in the Office of Contracts, and
17	since, as you know, I also have a history
18	in both the land use and campaign finance
19	arena.
20	I'll make two observations: One,
21	obviously, if the mechanism were not an
22	outright ban on certain types of
23	contributions, there is an element,
24	certainly, of self enforcement that would

occur.

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2	I have had lobbyists, in that arena,
3	including the land use arena, comment that
4	they would be delighted if they no longer
5	were able to answer those invitations.
6	And so if there were known a public
7	prescription of on certain kinds of
8	campaign contributions, it's not clear to
9	me that people are so desperate to bring
10	out their checkbooks that they would still
11	be there.
12	The second observation that I would
13	make, which is related, and particularly, I
14	think true, with the land use arena is that
15	there is such a level of public
16	attention that you mentioned, Ms.
17	Patterson, the Community Board and the
18	Borough President, and the involvement at
19	the earlier stages it's widely known who
20	the real parties of interest in most of
21	these disputes are.
22	And if there were a disclosure rule
23	that identified that a certain type of
24	individual was either prohibited from
25	making a donation or prohibited from

1	
2	matching funds, again, there's an element
3	of community based enforcement and press
4	based awareness that would be inevitable
5	and would not make the determining of who
6	those folks were terribly difficult.
7	It is a process that is subject to a
8	great deal of sunshine. This would add a
9	layer of sunshine, and the fact that you
10	had a violation that would occur by virtue
11	of someone writing a check, or someone
12	failing to check a box on a campaign
13	disclosure form, probably would get
14	attention in most cases.
15	MS. PATTERSON: I think the one
16	thing it takes a while for the light
17	bulb to go on some time, but early in your
18	presentation, you talked about how land use
19	issues are not doing business, because
20	there is literally no outflow of cash from
21	the City to a provider of goods of services
22	as there is in the case of concessions,
23	franchises and contracts.
24	The current the 1998 revision of

the Charter says, "Doing business". Is it

1	
2	your official position that we would not
3	have authority to promulgate regulations
4	that would put restrictions based purely
5	on that 1998 Charter provision without
6	additional legislation, we would not have
7	authority to impose restrictions on
8	contributors who might have applications
9	pending on land use issues?
10	MR. KARNOVSKY: I have no opinion
11	about jurisdiction
12	MS. PATTERSON: That's the
13	implication
14	MR. KARNOVSKY: No, what I was
15	trying to do is distinguish between doing
16	business in the form of contracts and
17	franchises or concessions, where there's
18	either money flowing out of the City or
19	money coming into the City and land use
20	determinations.
21	Those parties, who are applicants
22	before the Department and the Planning
23	Commission, are doing business within the
24	meaning of Chapter 68, if that's relevant
25	to you.

1	
2	MS. PATTERSON: I just wanted to
3	make certain.
4	MR. KARNOVSKY: So it's a different
5	form of doing business. It's analogous to
6	various kinds of regulatory licenses and
7	permits. It is simply distinctive from
8	contracts; that's the only point I was
9	trying to make.
10	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay, thank you all
11	very much. And I do think the Campaign
12	Financing Board staff is likely to be in
13	touch with you guys to explore various
14	ideas. Thank you.
15	So Fran Reiter, is your colleague
16	just going to watch?
17	MS. REITER: Absolutely. He's been
18	here before. I really came because it's
19	nice to see some of my former colleagues.
20	First of all, thank you. When we
21	received a notice of another hearing in the
22	office, my partner, Marty Begun, as he is
23	want to do, dropped it on my desk, and

having already been here, I looked it and

read it and said, "You know what, maybe I

24

have something to say about this".

I called Nicole and said, "If you're

interested, I'm happy to come in and share

some thoughts with you." I have not done a

long prepared statement. I think there's

probably more to be gained by questions and

answers, but let me say this:

I think I sit before you with a unique perspective on these issues, simply from having served in a wide array of capacities that touch on or are related to the issues you're dealing with.

I've been a political party activist for over twenty years; served as a campaign manager of a major Mayoral campaign; served in government for three and a half years, as Deputy Mayor for Planning and Community relations and Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development where I probably entertained more lobbyists than any other member of the Mayor's administration, simply by virtue of the areas that I over saw.

So, I've dealt with lobbyists; dealt

2	with the politics of this. I have headed
3	two not-for-profit organizations, both of
4	which were sizably funded by government,
5	and today I work as a government relations
6	consultant, albeit, doing minimal lobbying
7	but do occasionally step into that arena.
8	So I've given a lot of thought to
9	these issues. I want to begin by saying that
10	I'm a major supporter of the New York City
11	Campaign Finance Board, and while certainly
12	in my capacity as a Campaign Manager, have
13	sometimes taken issue with the decisions of
14	this Board, that notwithstanding, I think
15	that the New York City Campaign Finance
16	Program has been a major, major step

And please don't construe anything I say here today as in any way critical of the CFB and the role that it has played and continues playing.

forward for better government and better

politics in this City.

I should mention as well, I've also been a candidate twice. I ran for Congress in 1990, under the Federal system, and I

2	also	explored	а	run	for	Mayor,	a	few	years
3	ago,	under the	e (CFB.					

So I was out there, in the trenches, raising money, before admitting to myself how much I absolutely hated raising money and decided not to pursue that election.

So given that background, and given what you are charged with, in considering the issue of pay to play and influence peddling and any other way you want to phrase that, here are just some thoughts that maybe we can talk about.

I think that disclosure, that shining a spotlight on those who do business with the City is admirable and is something that should be pursued, and I think, to the extent that technology exists today to make that easier, then I think that's great.

I think knowing who is doing
business with the City, whether it's in
relation to any contributions they may be
making or some of the issues you just
raised regarding land use, whether or not

1	
2	they are good providers of service, good
3	builders of buildings, all of them, I think
4	is positive.
5	I think, however, that if we're
6	going to talk about influence peddling,
7	frankly, the limits that are currently
8	placed on campaign contributions, which I
9	am wholly supportive of and I would echo
10	Marla's statement that I don't think
11	there's a lobbyist in the City who would
12	not welcome a restriction on being able to
13	write checks having said all of that, I
14	would suggest to you that given the limits
15	of campaign donations generally, just in
16	terms of sheer dollar signs that, there are
17	far greater influences being peddled in
18	this City than money, and that beyond
19	disclosure, to seek other ways of
20	controlling contributions per se, is
21	meaningless.
22	I realize that that's a fairly
23	extreme statement, but frankly I believe
24	it. We have, today, in the City after 30

years, an extraordinarily transparent group

1	
2	of processes, whether it's around
3	contracting, the RFP process, VENDEX; all
4	kinds of disclosures.
5	We have enormous safeguards
6	surrounding that we have placed on our
7	process, and I think that that has made all
8	of these areas that you're investigating
9	transparent to the point where the truth is
10	when is the last contracting scandal we've
11	had in the City?
12	I mean, to a certain extent, I'm
13	sitting here saying, what is the impetus
14	for this. The Mayor, really. Clearly, the
15	truth is, we have a very transparent
16	system, and we have a system where
17	community involvement, advocacy
18	involvement, community involvement and
19	special interest involvement all sort of
20	have opportunities to weigh in on these
21	issues, whether it's land use; whether it's
22	concessions; whether it's contract.
23	I would suggest to you that the
24	influence that the advocacy community
25	places on elected officials is far greater

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2	than campaign contributions. I would even
3	go so far to say and some may found this
4	outrageous that the dollars
5	given/contributed by business interests in
6	this City are about the only way many of
7	them can offset or seek to balance the
8	influence of advocacy organizations.
9	And by the way, I spend a good part
10	of my life these days, as a private
11	citizen, being an advocate. I sit on the
12	boards of a number of not-for-profits, at
13	least one of which is almost exclusively an
14	advocacy organization, so I've had that
15	experience, as well.
16	I know the role we play as an
17	advocate. I respected it when I was in
18	government, on the other side, very often.
19	The point I'm making is that we
20	have, what I believe, is a balanced system,
21	and that seeking to regulate to an even
22	greater extent campaign finance as a way of
23	addressing a problem that I generally don't
24	think exists, I think ultimately may hurt

the campaign finance system.

2	I think at a certain point, if you
3	make this system too cumbersome and it
4	is cumbersome, make no bones about it.
5	This is a cumbersome system. It costs
6	campaigns a lot of money to comply with
7	campaign finance regulations, and while
8	that may not go towards their spending cap,
9	it's still money there limits on
10	spending, it still goes it still has to
11	be raised.
12	So I'm concerned to the extent that
13	you're seeking to address a problem, one, I
14	don't really think exists; two, to the
15	extent it does, I don't think it's
16	there's anything that you can do that is
17	going to change that.
18	To a point that Rabbi Potasnik made,
19	the truth is, if you really want to
20	influence peddle, via money, there's
21	nothing you or anybody else can do to avoid
22	that.
23	At a certain level, somebody who is
24	unethical or a criminal, is going to find a
25	way to do that. The question is, whether

1	
2	or not, as a matter of public policy and
3	regulation, conceivably of law, whether or
4	not there are remedies that we should
5	that we should seek and I would suggest
6	that to meet a remedy, you have to first
7	have an illness, and I'm not sure there's
8	an illness here.
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: Were you in the
10	administration, when the 1998 Charter
11	issued its (inaudible) that we should come
12	up with regulations on this subject?
13	MS. REITER: No, and I all I'm
14	saying is I believe that the regulations
15	you've arrived at, including the 1998 I
16	mean, my understanding of the 1998 revision
17	is that you've been charged with
18	investigating this, and looking to see if
19	there are ways to address the issue of
20	influence peddling and pay to play, and I
21	understand that.
22	All I'm suggesting is that having
23	gone through this investigation and having
24	heard from a wide array of individuals on

this topic, I would suggest that having

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done that, you can legitimately come back
and say that from the Campaign Finance
Board standpoint, not necessarily
legislatively, not necessarily in terms of
what the City Council may choose to do, but
that from the CFB's perspective, what you
have done thus far is sufficient to assure
the integrity of our system.

Believe me, as somebody in government who met with lobbyists, there is not a lobbyist in the world who exerted as much influence on a decision; there is not a campaign contributor who exerted as much influence on a decision that we might be making on public policy, as the advocates opposed to whatever they wanted; that the political ramifications of advocacy in this City are huge, they are absolutely huge.

If you want to talk about influence peddling that I think we need to deal with, you're not even touching the subject, which is the role of public employee unions on public policy making in this City.

I mean, imagine if you are a

1	
2	stockholder in a public company and your
3	Board of Directors is charged with making
4	decisions that are in the best interest of
5	the stockholders; that's how I think of a
6	Mayor.
7	A Mayor is elected by the people of
8	the city and is charged with ultimately
9	doing what he or she believes is in the
10	best interest of the city.
11	Well, if the CEO of General Motors
12	was found to be in cahoots with the head of
13	UAW, the stockholders would go nuts and yet
14	here's what happens in New York City.
15	We have public employee unions who
16	are allowed to contribute in all manner of
17	ways, from money to services, campaign
18	services, to campaigns for offices that
19	ultimately are charged with negotiating
20	their contracts.
21	This to me is the most blatant
22	conflict of interest in the City. I'm a
23	union member. I've been a member of two
24	unions. I'm a union member today. I'm not

anti-union. I think that in the world of

pay-to-play, though, as it pertains to
those unions that are directly impacted by
the decisions made by elected officials,
that that's something that you should be
looking at; that is something that affects
every single New Yorker, in very material
ways.

But in terms of business interests, people who do business with the City, the contributions you're talking about, that under your very fine system are considerably limited are a minor issue, compared to the very public processes we now have in this City, thank goodness, and the difficulty, frankly, that public -- those public processes result in, in terms of actually getting something done.

You know, it becomes something of a -- having gone back to school, since leaving public life, I've become somewhat more a history -- a student of American history. I have -- I'm not a lawyer. Most people think I have, having worked in the Giuliani administration, but I was the

exception to the rule -- but I've had

reason to study many of the Federalist

Papers and have become most intrigued by

Federalist 10, where Madison discusses our

form of the a large republic being the

greatest defense against factionalism.

We are, at our core, as a country, a country where we've built into the system mechanisms for making change hard. Change shouldn't come easy. I think that's a good thing. I think James Madison would be shocked to see the extent with which we've made change difficult in the City of New York.

What the Federalist papers envision, and what our basic system of government is, pales in comparison to the difficulties involved in making policy decisions. We have so many checks and balances in the City -- I can think of a major elected official in this state, who specifically, funneled money to a major, not-for-profit advocacy organization, simply so that the organization wouldn't protest this elected

1	
2	official.
3	This was an organization that was
4	when I tell you over the top in terms of
5	protesting, protest liberals, Democrats,
6	Republicans, it didn't matter who, if you
7	were an elected official, you got slammed.
8	One of them just said, "I don't want
9	any of this". I'm not going to say who it
10	is. All I'm saying is influence comes
11	in all shapes, sizes, forms.
12	The question is are our systems
13	transparent? Are they very public? Is
14	there lots of opportunity for opposition to
15	public policy, to the media, to investigate
16	and shine an even greater spotlight on the
17	kinds of issues you're seeking to deal
18	with?
19	I would suggest, yes, and that, if
20	you make this system, that you're
21	specifically charged with investigating,
22	the campaign finance system, more
23	cumbersome than it already is; more
24	difficult than it already is to comply
25	with, that you will cut off your nose to

1	
2	spite your face.
3	That we'll see more and more
4	candidates not opting into the system,
5	which would be a tragedy, and frankly,
6	you'll see more and more businesses throw
7	up their hands and say, `I don't want to do
8	business with the City of New York
9	anymore'.
10	We contract out an enormous number
11	of services, which I personally think is a
12	good thing. I believe in privatization,
13	but for privatization to work, you want the
14	greatest competition in the market place
15	responding to City business; that's good
16	government.

To the extent we get fewer private industries that want to do business with the City of New York, I think that's a bad thing all around and bad for competition and bad for the City of New York.

So I worry that we don't over regulate. I worry that we'll kill the very good thing that we've done in this City over the last thirty years, one of the best

1	
2	being the campaign finance system, that
3	we'll do great damage to it if we seek to
4	over regulate in areas where personally, I
5	think new regulation is simply
6	unnecessary.
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: Joe, do you have any
8	questions?
9	MR. POTASNIK: Well, I just wondered
10	how you would take on some of those
11	advocacy groups. You know, the City
12	Council is not going to legislate against
13	those unions, it's not going to happen.
14	MS. REITER: I'm not here, Rabbi,
15	suggesting that I have an answer to all of
16	this. I think that the only way the
17	only time the City Council will ever
18	respond not to take on the City Council,
19	per se, but the political establishment,
20	generally, the elected officials
21	generally is if there's such a public
22	outcry that the political ramifications of
23	non-support outweigh the political
24	positives of having that union's support.
25	Tim not a lawwer I don't know

1	
2	whether there is any legal mechanism for
3	supporting such a ban, but I think it's an
4	absolutely terrible, terrible thing, and,
5	um, but I agree with you, I think it
6	would be an enormously difficult thing to
7	accomplish.
8	MR. SCHWARTZ: Do you have a
9	question?
10	MS. PATTERSON: Well, I mean, I just
11	had an observation. I mean, you've been
12	involved in not-for-profits; you've been
13	involved in for-profits and you've been on
14	the other side, which means you have
15	undoubtedly heard complaints from entities
16	that do business with the City about the
17	VENDEX system.
18	The only thing that seems infinitely
19	more cumbersome than complying with
20	campaign finance rules is providing all the
21	data required by VENDEX, and yet there
22	doesn't seem to be any there seems to be
23	negligible deterrent effect to institutions
24	that do business with the City in terms of

25 complying with VENDEX.

1	
2	If they already got an
3	infrastructure in place for filing a bunch
4	of forms, how much worse can it be for
5	there restrictions on campaigns; that's a
6	very small portion of compliance for a
7	business
8	MS. REITER: Yeah, I'm more
9	concerned I'm more concerned with the
10	CFB, with the ultimate impact on candidates
11	and whether or not they end up opting into
12	campaign finance.
13	MS. PATTERSON: And then I'll ask
14	you one more question which is popping
15	through my head
16	MS. REITER: I mean, can I ask a
17	question?
18	What is it that you believe a real
19	estate developers gets, when he I was
20	going to say he or she, but the truth is I
21	don't know any real estate developers
22	MS. PATTERSON: I do
23	MS. REITER: Maybe one. Maybe one.
24	MS. PATTERSON: She's been very
25	successful.

1	
2	MS. REITER: It is one of the last
3	bastions of male dominance in
4	I mean, what is it that you think
5	they're buying?
6	What is it that we're trying to
7	regulate or legislate?
8	MR. SCHWARTZ: You can turn that
9	question around and ask how come we get
10	extra contributions from real estate people
11	when their matters are pending before the
12	City, which we clearly do.
13	Obviously, they're getting they
14	hope they're getting influence.
15	I mean, are they?
16	I think that's a different question.
17	MS. REITER: Well, but I think that
18	is the question. I think, actually, since
19	land use issues are obviously part of what
20	you're looking at, as you've heard, from
21	the earlier testimony, I think that the
22	notion of one influences the City
23	Planning that these contributions
24	influence the City Planning Commission
25	are it's just not real; that the

1	
2	professional that the professional
3	nature of the Department of City Planning,
4	the process itself, the scrutiny that it
5	comes under by
6	Remember, land use issues are
7	perhaps the most contentious issues in this
8	City. I mean not perhaps, they are.
9	And politicians, elected officials are
10	very, very wary of carry anybody's water.
11	A campaign contribution is nothing
12	compared to what community activist and
13	others, the havoc they will wreak on an
14	elected official.
15	I just don't buy it. Frankly, I
16	mean really, what I think they're buying,
17	is, `Don't hate me quite as much as you
18	already do'.
19	My experience with the real estate
20	community is they know that they are widely
21	viewed by the public as being bad guys and
22	if they're giving a contribution to an
23	elected official it's simply so that
24	they'll be viewed a little less poorly than
25	they otherwise might.

1	
2	But that in terms of actually
3	getting something for it, Mr. Chairman, I
4	don't buy it.
5	MS. PATTERSON: But isn't there
6	something to not being hated quite so much?
7	Let's say you have a developer,
8	regardless of gender, who is seeking to
9	change how can I put this politely
10	let's see, seeking to change an area of
11	warehouse use to giant box store use
12	MS. REITER: Right. A subject I'm
13	an expert on, and failed at.
14	MS. PATTERSON: (Continuing) and
15	there is a Borough President, who is an
16	elected official, who can weigh in
17	positively, negatively or silently on that
18	issue; there are City Council members who
19	can do the same, because they know that
20	even though it rarely comes to this,
21	even a positive decision by the City
22	Planning Commission can be overturned by
23	Council, and even though, that is

something, that as I understand it, almost

never happens, the stake is there.

24

1	
2	MS. REITER: A box retail is a
3	perfect example.
4	MS. PATTERSON: And of course, one
5	of the issues with the Campaign Finance
6	Board is that a qualifying contribution is
7	turbo charged by for the benefit of a
8	candidate that is within the program,
9	because that qualifying contribution gets a
10	multiple of taxpayer money.
11	So given all of that, given, as
12	Rabbi Postanik has said, the wealth can be
13	spread in a whole variety of weighs
14	MS. REITER: And bribes can be
15	there's all kinds of
16	MS. PATTERSON: Let's assume it's
17	all legitimate. We're not talking about
18	bribes here.
19	The wealth can be spread in a
20	variety of ways, which can then be
21	turbo charged by the virtues of the
22	multiples in the financial system, there
23	may be some virtues to being for a
24	developer who wants to do a retail box

store to not being disliked so much by the

1	
2	Borough President; not being disliked so
3	much by City Council representatives who
4	are in the district or near the district or
5	the district that might be affected.
6	MS. REITER: All I can tell you is
7	that Wal-Mart doesn't have enough money
8	I'm serious, I mean this very seriously
9	I'm not going to suggest to you that being
10	a little less hated isn't an advantage.
11	Mostly, all it does is get you a
12	meeting that you otherwise might not have
13	had, but I simply do not believe that
14	there's enough money in the world; there
15	are not enough cousins in the world
16	MS. PATTERSON: That are residents
17	in New York City?
18	MS. REITER: (Continuing) that
19	are residents in New York City, to
20	contribute to a multitude of campaigns,
21	that comes close to offsetting the
22	opposition the opposition to these major
23	land use issues.
24	Look, you know, do you kill a fly
25	with a fly gwatter or do you kill a fly

1	
2	with a sledge hammer?
3	And I would suggest that you're
4	attempting to kill a fly with a sledge
5	hammer.
6	Sure, you can pass some more
7	legislation, I mean, assuming the law
8	allows you to. The point is, is that
9	really the way to do this?
10	Is that the most effective way?
11	Is it the most effective use of
12	people's time?
13	Is it has to become more
14	burdensome to that a lot of these issues
15	are ideological, philosophical. I mean at
16	certain point, lots of people, including
17	business people, make contributions not
18	because they want something specific; they
19	make contributions to candidates because
20	they believe that candidate philosophically
21	is going to be more to their way of
22	thinking, and development issues are a
23	perfect example.
24	There are elected officials who are
25	very anti-development; they're happy to say

2	they are. They want more open space. More
3	public space, more parks, that's fine.
4	And then there are people who
5	believe that the City, to do all the things
6	that it wants to do, needs to enhance
7	economic development activities; needs to
8	do more kinds of development; needs to do
9	X, Y and Z, and the business community may
10	very well look upon that person as saying,
11	` I may never do business with the City,
12	but whether I do or not, this is the person
13	I want to elect, because I think that that
14	person philosophically is going to be
15	someone who is going to create an
16	environment in the City, where the things I
17	want to do, that are important, and
18	important for my business, by the way, are
19	more in line with my thinking; and that is,
20	by the way, why we vote for people.' The
21	business community is no different.
22	So that once you start once you
23	start going down this road, I don't know
24	where it ends. I don't know how you
25	regulate contributions for people who do

1	
2	business with the City we have a
3	contracting process that is incredibly
4	transparent. If somebody wins a contract
5	in this City, and a competitor can make
6	even the slightest case that that contract
7	was not awarded on merit, they're going to
8	march into Court with an Article 78
9	proceeding, and this thing is going to see
10	the light of day immediately.
11	So I don't know what it is that
12	we're really trying to accomplish here,
13	other than sort of feel good measures.
14	Let's be more transparent. Let's
15	make it easier for the press and the public
16	to know who is doing business with the
17	City, and who in turn is making
18	contributions, I think that's great, but I
19	don't understand why that's not enough.
20	MR. POTASNIK: Fran, would we if
21	we look at lobbyists and developers in the
22	City, would we find all of them making
23	significant contributions to candidates, or

are -- is there a group that gives very

little, and yet still has a lot of access

24

1	
2	and still has
3	MS. REITER: I have to tell you, I
4	saw every land use lobbyist known to human
5	kind when I was a Deputy Mayor. I did not
6	know most of them before I came into
7	government. I didn't know them
8	politically. I didn't know them at all.
9	There were one of two of them who I
10	had met at Giuliani fund raisers. I didn't
11	know how much money they were given. I
12	didn't know how much money they collected.
13	I never asked anybody.
14	If you wanted a meeting with me,
15	you got a meeting with me. And I tell you
16	something, I approve of lobbyists. I think
17	that they serve an enormously important
18	function in government. Government is
19	unbelievably difficult to navigate. Our
20	rules, our regulations, knowing where to
21	go, knowing who to talk to this is
22	a
23	A good lobbyist performs two vital
24	functions, one, knowing in fact how the
25	system works, so that you actually can

figure out who to go to see to get your
voice heard. Two, a good lobbyist knows
how government works and explains to the
client, here is what possible and here is
what is not possible.

A bad lobbyist doesn't do that. If someone comes in wanting to do business with the City and asks for something so totally off the wall, that if even if you wanted to do it, you couldn't do it.

Lobbyists are very important to the process, and elected officials would love to stand up, and all of a sudden there's some mini scandal about lobbyist, and they stand up and say 'Nobody wants' -- if this sounds familiar -- 'Nobody who comes up to my administration needs a lobbyist to be heard'. Non-sense. There are twenty-four hours in a day, and those who most who people doing business with the City wants to see or needs to see, gets 5,000 requests a day to be seen. You can't see everybody.

Does having a lobbyist make a difference? Absolutely, you know why?

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2	Because it says to the government
3	official and by the way, we're not
4	talking elected officials here. I wasn't
5	elected to anything; I was an appointed
6	official it says that, this is serious
7	enough that somebody made the investment to
8	hire somebody to figure out how to do this.
9	So does it perhaps make it easier
10	for them to make a meeting?
11	Yeah, but not because of a campaign
12	contribution. Simply because somebody who
13	knows how the system works, has called your
14	office and said, `Look, this is a project
15	we'd like to tell you about; we think
16	you'll be interested, we think the Mayor
17	will think this is in keeping with his
18	agenda, blah, blah, blah' and you say,
19	`Fine, come in and tell me about it', but
20	they're very valuable.
21	Some of them raise a lot more money
22	than others, yes. If there's some area
23	that I would suggest you look at, I think
24	lobbyists who professionally act as
25	fund raisers as well are a problem.

2	I think that that is a conflict of
3	interest that I am uncomfortable with.
4	When I say "act as fund raisers", I'm not
5	talking about somebody who goes and gets
6	their client to put up \$250 for to a
7	candidate.
8	I'm talking about someone who's in
9	the business of political fund raising
10	who's also in the business of lobbying. I
11	think there you have a clear conflict of
12	interest, and if there is one part of this
13	that I would suggest is worth taking a very
14	close look at, that's it.
15	But generally speaking, you know,
16	lobbyists are under enormous pressure from
17	the very people who say they're all for
18	ethical government elected officials.
19	Come on. You know, people running
20	for office need to raise money, campaigns
21	are expensive; they're under enormous
22	pressure to do so, and they in turn exert
23	pressure on people who have money.
24	The public does not participate to
25	nearly as great an extent in an ideal

1	
2	world, you wouldn't have to do any of this.
3	Every one in the public would say, `Gee,
4	it's my civic responsibility to give \$5,
5	\$10, \$250, to support political candidates
6	because that's part of good citizenship.'
7	Well, I don't know what I'm smoking,
8	but that never happens, and the truth of
9	the matter is it's hard to raise money. I
10	hated raising money.
11	I raised almost \$350,000 about
12	\$370,000, in about a six month period, in
13	an exploratory committee to run for Mayor
14	of this City, under Campaign Finance.
15	I had hundreds of donors. I had a
16	lot of small donors. I had 250 matchable
17	donors. I was I was very close to
18	making the threshold for matching funds,
19	when I dropped dead.
20	I hated every single minute of it.
21	I felt like a whore and I said, `I'd like
22	to be Mayor of City of New York, but this
23	isn't worth it', and I stopped.
24	You know, God bless, good elected
25	officials who are prepared to put

2	themselves through it and do it; I wouldn't
3	wish it on my worst enemy. I understand
4	the pressures that they're under,
5	particularly once you City Council races
6	are different; lower threshold; doesn't
7	take as much money.
8	Once you're in a at a race where
9	you need significant paid media, it becomes
10	the most horrible process imaginable, and
11	you've made it better. You've made it
12	easier, but it's still incredibly
13	difficult.
14	And frankly, if you now start
15	restricting contributions from people who
16	do business with the City, I have to tell
17	you, I'd be if I were a candidate ever
18	again and I will not be, not `I don't
19	intend to be'; I won't be I don't think
20	I'd opt in, as supportive as I am.
21	It would become too onerous, if you
22	take the business community out of mix.
23	Candidates are going to have very, very
24	serious problems raising money.
25	MS. GORDON: I just have a question

1										
2	that -	- I	wanted	to	ask	you	to	make	a	

4 concerned about the question of onerousness

distinction -- I think the Board is very

5 to the candidates.

Do you make a distinction that -are you saying that in general that you
don't think there should be a regulation -any additional regulation on contribution
for people doing business in the City, or
if you took the responsibility of the
candidate out of picture and only --

In other words, it did not become a question of whether the candidate had to gather information, do reporting, et cetera, but as a separate exercise, the person who sought to do business, as we were describing before, somebody who let's say, who's applying for it's own variance, at some other stage, in some other forum, said, 'You know, I want to get this kind of business for the City'.

I check off the box, `I have not' or `have given a contribution', and at the doing business side you're excluded or

1	
2	included, but not on the candidate giving a
3	contribution side; that the consequence of
4	making the contribution is either you have
5	to retrieve it somehow, or you really
6	cannot pursue this avenue that you were
7	possibly interested in.
8	The way the FCC says, `If you want
9	to do municipal stuff, your employee can't
10	give contributions in excess of X amounts
11	and have to live in the jurisdiction, but
12	other than that, no contributions.,
13	And it's virtually self policing,
14	because no one wants to risk something
15	that's really much bigger than their
16	contributions that they might make locally.
17	If that were the approach, would you
18	similarly just are you is your
19	position that you think doing business
20	contributions, either do or don't have that
21	much influence; they don't require special
22	treatment beyond disclosure or
23	MS. REITER: That's exactly how I
24	feel about it. That's exactly how I feel

about it, and I think you can increase

2	disclosure and I think the things that
3	you're pursuing that I've before coming
4	here, I went on to your web site last
5	night, to take a look at some of the
6	earlier testimony from here, particularly
7	that of DOITT I mean, I think clearly
8	technology is going to allow for better
9	disclosure and I think that that's great.
10	I think that if if on a campaign
11	distribution form, there's a check off box
12	that says, you know, `Have you ever done
13	business ever done business with the
14	City' or `Are you doing business with the
15	City,' or whatever, and you want to require
16	people to check it off, so that that goes
17	into that raises a flag and at least it
18	can be looked at, fine.
19	I have no issue at all with
20	disclosure. I think, in fact, it's this
21	whole issue of transparency in government
22	process, which is why, I think, we don't
23	have to go much further.
24	You know, I'm really concerned
25	with number one, I don't think the money

1	
2	we're talking about actually plays the kind
3	of influential role lots of people think it
4	does. And number two, I really am
5	concerned that if we keep whittling away,
6	and whittling away at the kind of money
7	that can be contributed
8	I mean, you've dealt with corporate
9	contributions. I don't really know what
10	that accomplished, but meanwhile LLPs and
11	LLCs can still make contributions.
12	I mean it's a little hard to fathom
13	what it is that we're really trying, really
14	substantively trying to accomplish.
15	I think we all want an ethical
16	system. We all want a transparent system,
17	but when we start putting restrictions
18	on real restriction on who can
19	contribute we've already restricted how
20	much we can contribute when we start
21	putting restrictions based on who is doing
22	business with the City and who may do
23	business with the City, I think you're now
24	crossing into the line where you're making

raising money that much more difficult.

2	If you take out business
3	contributions, you're going to be hurting
4	campaigns; there's no question, and I
5	really think that there will come a point
6	when New York Times editorials
7	notwithstanding, people are going to start
8	opting out.
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay, so, thank you
10	for your testimony.
11	MS. REITER: Thank you.
12	MR. SCHWARTZ: We're going to take a
13	one minute recess, and then Suzanne Novak
14	is next, and then Doug Israel, and then I
15	think there's some other person who wants
16	to speak. So the next witness can come up
17	and get comfortable up there.
18	(Whereupon, at this point in the
19	proceedings there was a recess and the
20	matter continued as follows:)
21	MS. NOVAK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
22	and members of the Board. You took away my
23	opening line. I've not discussed this
24	testimony with Chairman Schwartz.
25	My name is Suzanne Novak. I'm the

2.

Deputy Director in the democracy program, at the Brennan Center for Justice.

The Brennan Center seeks to achieve a mission of an inclusive and effective democracy. We have been working in the area of campaign financing reform since the center's inception in 1995 on the local, State and Federal levels, both in research, public advocacy, public outreach and education and legal advocacy.

I did not prepare written testimony today because when I started to, I realized and remembered that my former colleague, Adam Morris, testified before this Board in January of 2005, and so I have put copies of his testimony out there and I have extra copies and am here today to summarize that testimony; talk about a few additional things that the Brennan Center has done since then that might relate to your considerations; talk about a few questions raised and the letter inviting us here to testify and to answer any questions that you may have.

2	The Brennan Center has we
3	commended you all for considering pay to
4	play regulations and considering putting
5	regulating contributions, in addition to
6	disclosure.
7	The Courts have generally upheld
8	such narrow bans on contributions.
9	There's no case law binding in New York and
10	there has been various case law around the
11	Country, but nothing on the Supreme Court
12	level.
13	But, you know it's a question of
14	what a Court would consider a narrow ban.
15	So there it's also important that if you
16	are to either enact yourselves or encourage
17	the City to enact some sort of regulation of
18	contributions to also consider
19	anti-circumvention measures.
20	But as you understand, the more
21	anti-circumvention measures you put into
22	place, the broader then the ban becomes and
23	then the closer it might be to its
24	constitutionality being questioned.
25	Since the testimony that was

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2	provided last year, I, and my colleagues,
3	at the Brennan Center have been active in
4	advising Connecticut when they were
5	determining whether to enact pay to play
6	regulations and they subsequently did, and
7	so we provided written and oral testimony
8	for them.
9	One thing that we encouraged them to
10	do, which I don't think the Brennan
11	Center and Adam discussed last year here
12	was to consider enacting low limits, rather
13	than complete bans.
14	They ended up not following this
15	advice
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: You did that for sort
17	of defensive, constitutional defensive
18	reasons?
19	MS. NOVAK: Yes, for constitutional
20	reasons, which is that and although bans
21	have been upheld, like I said bans have
22	certainly been upheld, you a law
23	dramatically increases the likelihood of
24	being upheld as constitutional if there are
25	low limits and that is because there is

1	
2	some room you get to associate with the
3	candidate but you also decrease the
4	threat of corruption or appearance
5	dramatically if you have low limits.
6	And if you have bans, you really,
7	you are cutting off the ability to
8	associate in that way with the candidate.
9	Of course you're able to engage in other
10	activities. But the Supreme Court has
11	upheld very low limits generally, and so
12	there's no reason to believe that they
13	wouldn't upheld low limits, particularly
14	for those doing business with the City.
15	And the limits for the City as they
16	stand are not particularly low, so there is
17	certainly room that you can lower them.
18	Another thing that we encouraged the
19	Connecticut legislature to do, which they
20	didn't follow either, is to include some
21	sort of legislative findings, if you are to
22	enact it or encourage it, and you map out
23	why you are doing this.
24	Particularly in Connecticut, there
25	were many scandals that would have been

1	
2	easy to map out, but courts have been
3	have great deference to legislative
4	findings, and all that, and it certainly
5	could have increased the likelihood of a
6	law being upheld to talk about what has
7	happened in the past or perception of the
8	past, or what you foresee, what loop holes
9	would be, and this is why you enacted in
10	the way that you did. So we would
11	encourage that.
12	You should also be aware that
13	because this has not got on to the Supreme
14	Court and there's only been one Circuit
15	ruling on it, the Court's have applied all
16	different levels of scrutiny to bans and
17	limits, so it is unclear what level a Court
18	would apply to this.
19	And then, you have asked in your
20	letter about whether activity of
21	businesses, affiliated businesses should be
22	aggregated. And, again, this could be
23	anti-circumvention matters and it matters
24	how you know, it should be carefully

drawn; that you don't want to allow it such

1	
2	that a certain business would be able to do
3	it, but it has affiliates and they all
4	would be able to do that. Then again, you
5	don't want to get too far away from really
6	what you're trying to counter.
7	And then it sounds like there's been
8	some discussion earlier today, which I
9	didn't really hear, about the where the
10	burden of compliance should be.
11	There are some jurisdictions, and
12	you should consider the burden being at
13	both ends; both on the candidate and the
14	business, and if there is disclosure by
15	those doing business, that's where the
16	first burden applies, that it's either
17	check off or they have to file something
18	with the City when they begin negotiations,
19	when they have the contract; that it would
20	be easy enough for a candidate or an
21	official to find that, and the burden
22	should be on both ends.
23	And those were my
24	MR. SCHWARTZ: In Connecticut, what

was the form of their ban?

1	
2	In other words, was it on the
3	candidate accepting or on the business
4	giving.
5	MS. NOVAK: It was on the business
6	giving, and it is particular to the level
7	of government before which their contracts
8	are; which they had been considering a much
9	broader bans.
10	So, if you can get action from the
11	legislative, then your ban is on giving
12	contributions to the legislature, but if
13	it's before the Executive branch, then the
14	ban is there.
15	You know, there's certainly
16	something to consider, the different levels
17	of who you're going to ban, again, for
18	circumvention reasons, but again you get
19	broader
20	MS. PATTERSON: And what's the
21	consequence, if you do give you're the

23 MS. NOVAK: I don't know what the 24 penalty is and I don't know if it's just 25 particular to the provision, or if it's

business and you give --

1	
2	just what general penalties are for
3	violating campaign finance
4	MS. GORDON: But it's not it
5	doesn't prevent them from doing the
6	business?
7	MS. NOVAK: No
8	MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, New Jersey
9	does.
10	MS. NOVAK: New Jersey does. There
11	have been some, `You're prevented from
12	doing', and `You void the contract', and I
13	would have to, I would certainly
14	MS. GORDON: We can find that out
15	easily.
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: Did Connecticut
17	explore, as far as you know, defining doing
18	business more broadly than "contracts"?
19	MS. NOVAK: They actually have
20	definitions of "associated businesses", so
21	it is not necessarily someone who has
22	contracts.
23	MR. SCHWARTZ: Today we were talking
24	substantively about land use decisions, do
25	you know if Connecticut law hites on land

2	use decisions?
3	MS. NOVAK: I don't believe there's
4	anything specifically about that, but I
5	would have to look. I don't know all that
6	much about land use, what the language is
7	in Connecticut, if it covers that.
8	And like I hear the testimony here
9	today, there was a big point of contention
10	in Connecticut about whether to enact
11	those; especially since there were total
12	bans and they were originally considering
13	enacting it for all level of government,
14	and they were afraid this is where they get
15	a lot those candidates, who run
16	privately, which is what the system was in
17	Conneticutt, get a lot of their money from,
18	which then begs the question that maybe
19	it's necessary, but it was enacted along
20	with the full public planning (inaudible).
21	So I know that they see those two
22	things in tandem; that they were able to
23	enact this ban on such contributions,
24	because many of them planned to participate

in the public finance --

1	
2	MS. GORDON: So the ban only applies
3	I'm sorry, the ban or restrictions only
4	apply to publicly financed
5	MS. NOVAK: No, it applies to both.
6	But I think the my understanding is
7	amongst the legislature is they felt
8	comfortable putting this ban in place,
9	because they now mainly expect to run under
10	the public financing system, and so they
11	won't need these contributions as much.
12	Because
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: Is there a public
14	financing system, where you get a matching
15	grant, as in New York City, or where you
16	just get an out right
17	MS. NOVAK: No, it's a full public
18	finance system. You get an outright grant.
19	And the severability clause in Connecticut,
20	which is a main point of contention, ties
21	them all together.
22	And that's why I've learned through
23	these discussions, `Why are you tying these
24	bans to if the public financing system gets

struck down, and, you know, they're nervous

1	
2	about not being able to raise the necessary
3	funds, if public financing is not
4	available. This is the practicality and
5	(inaudible). Good to learn.
6	MR. SCHWARTZ: Was it your
7	experience that the legislation in
8	Connecticut was due to the fact that there
9	had been significant scandals in
10	Connecticut in the year before it was
11	passed
12	MS. NOVAK: The scandals led to a
13	lot a ton of public pressure, that I
14	think led to the enactment of those
15	restrictions.
16	But in addition, once Governor Rell
17	got on board, and was supportive of them,
18	she's Republican; Democratic legislature,
19	it all came together. The bans she
20	also insisted that you could only sign a
21	law that it was total ban, not limits. I
22	think that was one reason they had to go
23	that far.
24	Every one was always insisting on
25	that thus far hegging that's where their

1	
2	scandals were. Their scandals were with
3	contractors and not necessarily lobbyists,
4	and they put bans on both.
5	MR. SCHWARTZ: Do you have any
6	comments on the testimony of the witness
7	before you?
8	MS. NOVAK: I learned a lot from
9	that. I thought it was interesting. A
10	couple of things. I mean, I think the
11	discussion that was raised about let's say
12	Wal-Mart and whether there's influence,
13	even if the influences does not change the
14	vote, it's still influences and it's
15	influences that comes from money, and I
16	think that problematic and I think the
17	public sees that.
18	I mean there's a lot about whether
19	there's actual corruption, and of course
20	it's hard to prove, but it's the public
21	perception which it's great that, you
22	know, people are here testifying, letting
23	you know about that, but that really needs
24	to be watched out for.
25	I mean as we know, New York City has

1	
2	done an excellent job, and is a leader on
3	campaign finance laws, but needs to be
4	aware I mean, this is a movement and we
5	see it a lot around the country that
6	people are really wary of people who can
7	buy influence who are close to government.
8	And, in addition, when, I commend
9	her that she was not influenced; I'm not
10	sure that that is the same way, and I'm not
11	sure every government official is open to
12	every lobbyists who wants to speak to them.
13	And when you look at
14	contributions and I haven't looked
15	closely at New York City, but If you have
16	real estate developers, or whoever it is,
17	giving contributions to both candidates or
18	different parties, then they're not
19	contributing because that candidate
20	supports their beliefs or interests, it's
21	because they see it as buying interest.
22	And on the flip side, which I think
23	was the impetus for the FCC regulation, is

was the impetus for the FCC regulation, is they believe that they will be punished if they don't contribute.

1	
2	And so I am not sure that you're
3	receiving all the testimony, but that these
4	communities would be so against this type
5	of restriction, because they feel that they
6	need to be in this business of contributing
7	to all candidates in order to make sure
8	they are not punished.
9	MS. PATTERSON: Are there
10	restrictions in Connecticut on union
11	contributions?
12	I say "contributions", by use unions
13	doing business
14	MS. NOVAK: Yes, as long as they
15	fall under the definition. There's nothing
16	specific for unions, but if they're doing
17	business
18	MS. PATTERSON: But doing business
19	is defined broadly enough that a State
20	employee's union
21	MS. NOVAK: You think that's not
22	correct?
23	MS. GORDON: I thought that they
24	were carved out. I want to check on that.

I think I asked that question at some point

1	
2	of someone, and I thought unions got carved
3	out.
4	MS. PATTERSON: That was one of the
5	points made by the previous testimony, which
6	is that there's already a disparity in the
7	system which would be worse if there
8	were bans on
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: Maybe you can submit
10	a letter to us on that particular
11	MS. NOVAK: Yes. Right. I think
12	I'll submit a letter and I'll just describe
13	Connecticutt in a little more detail.
14	MS. PATTERSON: Thank you. And New
15	Jersey, as well.
16	MS. NOVAK: Yes. New Jersey has an
17	Executive Order also New Jersey has various
18	municipalities. I think there might be 17
19	or something
20	MS. GORDON: Crazy quilt.
21	MS. NOVAK: And they have a law that
22	specifically allows, and I guess kind of
23	encourages municipalities to enact their
24	own regulations. But, yeah I can ascribe
25	their Evecutive Order in New Jersey and

1	
2	also Connecticutt.
3	MR. SCHWARTZ: Any other questions?
4	(No response.)
5	MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you. Thank you
6	for your discretion in letting me know
7	you were coming here.
8	Okay, Doug Israel?
9	MR. ISRAEL: Thanks. Good
10	afternoon, Chairman Schwartz and members of
11	the Campaign Finance Board, I'm Doug Israel
12	the Public Policy and Advocacy Director for
13	Citizens Union. I'm not sure we're going
14	to add anything new today.
15	I came here to reiterate some of the
16	points that we made in earlier discussions
17	last year. There may be a couple of new
18	wrinkles in here, and I'm going to try to
19	keep it brief, as everyone is hungry for
20	lunch.
21	Citizens Union believes the steps
22	taken to strengthen the rules governing
23	lobbyists that's going on at the City
24	Council right now, and their political

contributions is good, and we also believe

1	
2	the continuing efforts to improve the
3	vendor data base is a very positive course
4	of action.
5	And we believe that these should be
6	coupled with sound legislation that aims to
7	further regulate pay to play activities.
8	And I guess inherent in this, is the
9	belief that we think that legislation
10	obviously would come from the City Council,
11	and that the Campaign Finance Board should
12	be cautious as it approaches any type of
13	restrictions on the contributions.
14	MR. SCHWARTZ: And we should be
15	cautious because it might adversely affect
16	the candidates in the campaign system if
17	it's done by our regulation?
18	MR. ISRAEL: Yes, adversely affect
19	them but also adversely affect impact
20	the system at the Campaign Finance Board
21	program itself by creating a deterrent
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: I mean I was I
23	agree with your conclusion, I was just
24	trying to make sure what your reasoning
25	was.

MR. ISRAEL: We think it's important

3	that the legislation also be consistent
4	with what is being deliberated now, as far as
5	regulation of lobbyists contributions at
6	the City Council.
7	We think it would be unwise to set
8	up some type of multi-tiered system, where
9	potentially City Council bans lobbyists'
10	contributions to elected officials and then
11	the Campaign Finance Board restricts
12	contributions to you know, I think it's
13	been put out there that maybe there should be
14	restrictions on contributions; they should
15	only be allowed 50 percent of the normal
16	contribution limit.
17	And if there were some type of
18	multi-tiered system set up like that, we
19	think that that would be, again,
20	detrimental to the program.
21	MR. SCHWARTZ: Let me see if I
22	understand you there.
23	What do you mean by a "multi tiered
24	system"?
25	MR. ISREAL: Again, consistency. I

1	
2	think it was put out there, in the hearings
3	last year, that potentially you can
4	restrict contributions from doing business
5	with the City to something at maybe half
6	the level of the normal contributions,
7	maybe \$125 is what it would be, and if the
8	City goes the City Council goes ahead
9	and entirely bans contributions from
10	lobbyists, you have lobbyists not being
11	able to give money, but the contractors
12	they represent giving half the allowable
13	contribution limit.
14	I just think these different tiers
15	and levels, I think would be confusing for
16	the candidates and the contributors. I
17	think it's important to be consistent with
18	what is going on with the City Council
19	right now.
20	And also, we're very we caution
21	that the Campaign Finance Board to be
22	careful not to over reach their limits.
23	This, you know, directly talks about the
24	land use, and how you do that.

You know, we think it's an easier

1	
2	sell to limit the contribution when there's
3	direct financial impact, such as those
4	doing business with the City, and I believe
5	that is what the Charter proposal was
6	trying to get at, expanding it to include
7	landmark decisions, administrative
8	decisions, legislation, et cetera, is a
9	slippery slope and something the Campaign
10	Finance Board should proceed very
11	cautiously on.
12	MR. SCHWARTZ: Let me push you a
13	little bit on that. Do you disagree with
14	the conclusion that land use presents the
15	greatest potential for the appearance of
16	corruption, because of there being so much
17	money involved in the land use decisions
18	that are made by the City?
19	MR. ISRAEL: I would agree, but
20	again, I think there's real caution that
21	needs to be addressed. Where do you draw
22	the line?
23	For instance, our organization
24	weighs in on what goes on at the Hudson
25	Pail Varde

1	
2	MR. SCHWARTZ: But you don't have an
3	economic interest, that's the distinction
4	between you and a developer.
5	MR. ISRAEL: Well, then, it should
6	be, again, it should be clear and specific.
7	Is it the developer; is it anyone with any
8	type of interest in the land use decision?
9	Because, you know, we potentially
10	advocated against the Atlantic Yards being
11	built for X, Y or Z reasons, and we are
12	weighing in on the land use process; we're
13	lobbying the City Council, you know, not to
14	approve of a certain project, does that
15	mean that my contributions, as a registered
16	lobbyist, are not equal to the average
17	contribution, because we think that there's
18	not a good reason for this involvement in
19	this specific site?
20	MS. GORDON: But you're going to be
21	covered, aren't you, what the City Council
22	is doing now on the lobbyist front is going
23	to cover you, isn't it?

MR. ISRAEL: I believe so.

MS. GORDON: But you support that?

24

2	MR. SCHWARTZ: No. No, I think he
3	doesn't. Would you maintain that there's a
4	difference between someone with an economic
5	motive and someone who doesn't?
6	MR. ISRAEL: Absolutely.
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: How do you respond to
8	the testimony of the person two
9	witnesses before, Ms. Reiter, who argued
10	that while the advocacy groups already have
11	so much influence; business doesn't have
12	much influence, why should we basically
13	she said, why should one be worried about
14	business contributions or if you are
15	worried, you're going to cut off too much
16	anyway.
17	Anyway, what reactions do you
18	have
19	MR. ISRAEL: I would respond that
20	the, you know, the advocacy community
21	that's just pure democracy, people getting
22	out there and protesting and visiting their
23	elected officials, et cetera, whereas, you
24	know, money has a corrupting influence, and
25	there's a real difference between organized

1	
2	activists getting out there and pushing
3	their elected officials and setting up
4	meetings than there is to campaign
5	contributions to that elected official.
6	MR. POTASNIK: Do you apply the same
7	logic to unions?
8	MR. ISRAEL: I mean unions are
9	always it's a difficult situation,
10	because they're an organized entity for
11	political purposes, that is somewhat
12	separate and has different rules than an
13	ordinary group of citizens organizing for
14	housing issues.
15	MS. PATTERSON: And yet the largest
16	contracts that the City has are with
17	unions representing City employees, and if
18	we're looking at people who have contracts
19	with the City, it's sort of hard to
20	overlook the largest ones.
21	MR. ISRAEL: I agree. Again, it's a
22	case of being not trying to over reach
23	and throw an umbrella over everybody and
24	just chilling political discourse
25	MR. SCHWARTZ: So let me this is

1	
2	interesting testimony coming from the
3	oldest political group in the City or at
4	least in the State.
5	What is your position on whether
6	there should be pay-to-play regulations,
7	beyond disclosure?
8	What is the Citizens Union's
9	position?
10	MR. ISRAEL: We believe that the
11	Campaign Finance Board has there's two
12	options that we believe the Campaign
13	Finance Board can appropriately weigh in
14	on. One, is disclosure for all.
15	MR. SCHWARTZ: Let's assume there is
16	improved disclosure.
17	MR. ISRAEL: Okay. Improved
18	disclosure for all I think is one, and the
19	other is the use of matching fund, whether
20	or not you're gonna apply a matching fund
21	for certain contributions.
22	But the Campaign Finance Board
23	banning or you know, restricting
24	contributions that only go towards
25	participants, we feel is not a good

1	
2	approach, because you're creating a
3	disincentive to people participating in the
4	program, and it's something that the City
5	Council should do very specifically, and
6	the language should be very clear and
7	targeted and it should apply to everybody,
8	whether you're participating or not.
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're in favor of
10	disclosure being maximized and then on
11	contributions, the Citizens Union favors a
12	law, but not a regulation by the Campaign
13	Finance Board?
14	MR. ISRAEL: Exactly.
15	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay.
16	MS. PATTERSON: But if the Campaign
17	Finance Board were to I think it may
18	depend on the substance of law or the
19	regulation if the Campaign Finance Board
20	were to adopt a regulation that simply said
21	no matching fund would be available, or a
22	smaller amount of matching funds would be
23	available if a contribution were made by,
24	let's say, a registered lobbyist, would the
25	Citizens Union have an objection to that?

2	MR. ISRAEL: No, I think that is
3	something that we think is more of an
4	appropriate role for the Campaign Finance
5	Board, on this issue.
6	MS. PATTERSON: Okay, because that's
7	a regulatory restriction that doesn't
8	affect the right to contribute to the
9	candidate, it simply means that tax payer
10	dollars are not going to be used to
11	increase the amount that is attributable to
12	today that contributor.
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: But of course, if
14	there is an appearance problem with maximum
15	contributions from people doing business
16	with the City, that particular approach
17	does not, by any means, get at it?
18	MS. PATTERSON: No, but I'm just
19	what I'm trying to distinguish between is
20	the legislative solution of reducing the
21	amount of the contribution or banning the
22	amount of the contribution from a certain
23	class of potential contributions, as
24	contracted with a regulatory approach,
25	which allows contributions to be made but

1	
2	simply says the taxpayer dollars will not
3	be used through the Campaign Finance Board
4	system to supplement the contribution that
5	has been made.
6	MR. ISRAEL: I think we agree with
7	that. And then, along those lines, there's
8	also something we argued for at the
9	City Council a couple of weeks back.
10	If you're you know, if they're
11	gonna not if you're not going to match
12	the contribution that come from lobbyists
13	you should not match the contributions that
14	a lobbyist bundles.
15	They often bundle somewhere
16	between you know, up to \$200,000 for a
17	given candidate in an election cycle. I
18	would say the same should apply here. If
19	you're going to not match or restrict the
20	contribution of a contractor, you know, if
21	they're raising \$90,000 or \$100,000 for a
22	candidate, it has the same, you know, level
23	of influence or impact, the bundling
24	activities, as well.

MS. PATTERSON: Well, I mean the

1	
2	other issue that was raised in the land use
3	case is that the name of the entity
4	that has an application pending for a
5	variance is virtually never the same name
6	as the entity that truly wields the control
7	over the particular that particular
8	applicant. It is the entity that wields the
9	control and power over the particular
10	applicant that is going to be procuring
11	contributions to elected officials.
12	MR. ISRAEL: I'm just going to hit
13	on, you know, a couple of items here. I
14	have nine things laid out that we think
15	legislation should address. This may be
16	more applicable for the City Council. It's
17	our position that they should pass
18	legislation.
19	But you know, the onus should be
20	placed on the City not the candidate to
21	determine and report who is doing
22	business with the City, and subject to the
23	terms of the legislation.
24	You know, two, we talked about
25	ensure that the definition of doing

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2	business with the City is clear and
3	specific. Those who do business with the
4	City should at the very least include
5	contractors and lobbyists and others who
6	stand to receive immediate financial gain
7	from the decisions.
8	And then we go on to say "The City
9	should examine the ability to restrict
10	contributions from others".
11	MR. SCHWARTZ: That gets awfully
12	broad though, if it's truly a generally
13	applicable law to say that you can't give
14	money because you support a truly
15	applicable law it seems to me to not have
16	much to do with the appearance of
17	corruption. I'm just thinking out loud or
18	that aspect.

MR. ISRAEL: Third, "enact a tight definition of seeking and doing business with the City or being in negotiation with the City to do business. Apply to all candidates for elected office", this is where we get at the real need for it to be real legislation, and not for just those

2	participating	in	the	Campaign	Finance
3	Program.				

Five, place the compliance burden on the individual or the entity making the contribution, and potentially, you know, no liability provision should be asserted for the candidate so that they don't two years or year after their election have fines of fifty to \$100,000, because they accepted a contribution that they were not aware was prohibited.

And not entirely ban contributions, so even with legislation, we believe that there shouldn't be an entire ban, you know, potentially limiting the size and then restricting matching funds I think are important --

MS. PATTERSON: I'm a little confused on the liability provision, because the Campaign Finance Board rules already impose fines for things such as over the limit contributions, inappropriate corporate contributions, that seems to be inherent in this system and candidates have

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2	accepted that.
3	I mean, they're not huge fines, but
4	they are nonetheless sufficient so that
5	candidates are aware that they do have some
6	requirement to verify that they are not
7	getting a contribution from a corporation
8	and that they're not getting too much money
9	from a particular individual contributor.
10	MR. ISRAEL: But it appears if we
11	set up a new system and have new
12	restrictions, and we say, `Well, the onus
13	will be on the contributor' and then the
14	candidate is still liable, then there's a
15	real disconnect there and I think a
16	disingenuity to it, if it's done that way.
17	Point seven, restricting
18	contributions by individuals or entities
19	doing business with the City for a set
20	amount of time, after the contract expires,
21	potentially up to a year or more.
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: Expires or is
23	granted?
24	MR. ISRAEL: I think both probably

would be.

2	And then this other one, assuring a
3	size of contracts trigger on contributions
4	restrictions. You know, in New Jersey,
5	Executive Board trigger applies to
6	contracts of about \$17,500, I believe;
7	under that, you would not be liable or you
8	would not be regulated in the same way.
9	I think Los Angeles is deliberating
10	something much bigger, in the range of
11	\$100,000. So, you know, we support
12	something along those lines but we think
13	that the trigger should apply to the total
14	contract's value because if you just look
15	at one contract, maybe for \$5,000 for
16	toilet paper for a school, but when you
17	look at the bigger contract that that paper
18	company may have with the City it could be
19	\$2 million.
20	So I think you have to look at the
21	total contracts, that that contractor has
22	in front of it.
23	MR. SCHWARTZ: Have you thought
24	about the distinction between contracts
25	that are discretionary on one hand and

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2	contracts that are bid contracts, where you
3	have the city is required you're
4	required to take the lowest possible
5	bidder.
6	MR. ISRAEL: No, I haven't thought
7	about that.
8	And then finally here, include in
9	the definition of those doing business with
10	the City, any spouse, domestic partner and
11	unemancipated children of such person or
12	intermediary and any officer or any person
13	exercises managerial control over the
14	entity doing business, or any person owning
15	more than five percent in the entity doing
16	business.
17	MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay.
18	MR. ISRAEL: I will we'll take a
19	look at this, the discretionary versus bid
20	contracting
21	MS. GORDON: That spouse part is a
22	two edged sword.
23	MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is?
24	MS. GORDON: The spouse/domestic
25	partner stuff. I mean, you can kind of

you see two sides. On the one hand, it's
surely true that people are able to, by
giving to on the other hand it just
assumes that they're not independent
actors.
The campaign finance law itself used
to combine husband and wife contributions
for the purpose of the contributions limit
and then it was changed to separate them
out.
MR. ISRAEL: So we thank you for the
opportunity to testify. We think this is
great we're happy that the Campaign
Finance Board is being so deliberative with
this process and being so open. We've had,
I believe four hearings on this.
So we thank you for that, we urge
you to coordinate and make this bill
consistent with what the City Council is
doing as well, and we feel free we look
forward to participating in the future.
MR. SCHWARTZ: So thank you very
much. And so there's another witness

Mr. Popik.

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2	MR. POPIK: Thank you very much, I
3	didn't know I can talk, I wasn't on the
4	calendar. I did speak at the earlier
5	hearings.
6	MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, I remember.
7	MR. POPIK: My name is Barry
8	Popik. I ran for Manhattan Borough
9	President in 2005 as a Republican
10	candidate. I didn't stand much of a
11	chance. We were outnumbered registration 6
12	to 1.
13	So you don't get many contributions
14	to a losing cause, you don't get any kind of
15	support and I didn't get equal time on New
16	York One or any of the networks.
17	But be that as it may, I really
18	didn't want to get involved in politics. I
19	started many, many years ago, when I solved
20	"Why New York is Called the Big Apple", as
21	you might know, and I gave it to a
22	Manhattan Borough historian, and she loved
23	my work, and she gave it to Manhattan
24	Borough President and nothing happened.
25	And I could never speak with the

1	
2	Manhattan Borough President. It's been
3	fifteen years and I've never been able to
4	speak to the Manhattan Borough President.
5	They eventually dedicated, through
6	six years of hard work my life "The Big
7	Apple Corner". It stands there, there's no
8	explanation as to why it's Big Apple
9	Corner. It's to a horse racing rider. He
10	admitted that he got it from an
11	African-American stable hand in New
12	Orleans, who has never been honored
13	whatsoever.
14	I wrote it into Scott Stringer,
15	didn't even reply. I wrote to my City
16	Councilman, who knows who I am now, doesn't
17	reply, and that's the influence
18	MR. POTASNIK: You need a good
19	lobbyist.
20	MR. POPIK: I do. People always
21	say, `You should get a good lobbyist', but
22	it shouldn't be that way, but that's how it
23	is in the City.
24	What I did is after Hurricane
25	Katrina. I wrote to Snapple. I said look.

1	
2	you're marketing New York City. I wrote to
3	Snapple I wrote to New York City Marketing.
4	I said, `Look, I'm the guy; this is a
5	perfect opportunity. You're marketing New
6	York City. Could you put on your bottle
7	caps, New York City Fact, Snapple fact,
8	that it comes from a African-American
9	stable hands; whose name we don't know;
10	who's probably the father or grandfather of
11	someone who is still living,' and they
12	didn't even reply to me.
13	Not - Snapple replied to me, not New
14	York City Marketing, and this is New York
15	City, and I'm outraged, and I ran for
16	office and nobody listened to me, but that's
17	another story.
18	I was going to debates with Scott
19	Stringer, one of things I did, is I
20	downloaded campaign financing, I see who is
21	contributing to him, and he's getting
22	\$1,000, \$1,000, \$1,000, maximum, maximum,
23	maximum, real estate, real estate, real

estate, lawyers who represent real estate.

Real estate. Real estate. Lobbyist, over

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2	and over again, and that matched four to
3	one.
4	I have to beg for \$5, beg from my
5	friends at work who have no money, for \$10,
6	and that's their life savings, that's
7	like if you get five or \$10 that's gold.
8	But for real estate, to give
9	maximum, that's nothing; that's just the
10	point of entry into the system, and for you
11	to match it now, I don't suggest
12	eliminating it.
13	Obviously that's pay-to-play money.
14	Obviously that's money well, Fran Reiter
15	said that it doesn't play importance, well,
16	if it makes you feel less antagonistic to
17	them, it's money that they have to spend.
18	They're going to spend it on Scott
19	Stringer, if they're going to spend it on
20	Eva Moskowitz, they're going to spend it on
21	whoever they think could buy them that
22	influence. They're going to spend it on
23	any candidate, usually Democrats who think
24	they can win; and they get their ear.
25	Not only that, they get invited to

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2	the inauguration. They get a handshake. I
3	wasn't even I applied for the Community
4	Board and I didn't even get an interview,
5	it seems. I got called for a Thursday for
6	a Friday, and I worked on Friday and I
7	worked on Thursday, and then they said,
8	`There's no more interviews, so long.
9	Thank you very much.' He appointed his
10	friends to the Community Board.
11	So what you have is, you have the
12	Borough President and he appoints all the
13	Community Board members, just about, and
14	then the ULURP process goes to the
15	community boards and goes up to the Borough
16	President and you have that Borough
17	President accepting all this money,
18	thousand and thousand of dollars of money
19	matched by money, as a public person, it's
20	outrageous.
21	Now, I don't suggest banning it,
22	because, first of all, it's a very
23	complicated thing of who is this person and
24	that person, and they disguise themselves
25	as housewives and whatever

2	But I suggested limiting. The
3	finance industry, if you want to donate to
4	the Comptroller, you work for say Goldman
5	Sachs or something. I suggest a \$250 is
6	fine for most any normal person. \$250,
7	over \$250, you're buying influence; you're
8	buying access. \$250, for any college
9	student, housewife, whatever is fine, but
10	over that is too much.
11	Again, I don't suggest limiting
12	anybody but I suggest going with that
13	limit, the same \$250 that the Goldman Sachs
14	people, who needs the Comptroller.
15	Certainly, real estate and lawyers
16	get into the Borough President if you
17	look at Scott Stringer's contributors, it's
18	outrageous.
19	Then after the election well
20	first of all, right before the election he
21	needed more money, he hits up his friend,
22	Peter Kalikow, the MTA and a huge real
23	estate developer, and I didn't raise no
24	money, whatsoever, just about, it was just
25	outrageous.

2	And then after he was elected
3	Borough President, there was a salute to
4	Scott Stringer I showed that to you
5	in Our Town, which they were planning
6	probably before the election even was over,
7	and you saw a building, the salute to Scott
8	Stringer, Glenwood Management says, "We
9	love you Scott," and you know they paid
10	thousands of dollars, at least a thousand
11	dollars for a full page ad.
12	You know, the Durst Organization
13	paid money for an ad, and that's
14	essentially a campaign contribution,
15	and Scott Stringer was quoted there I'm
16	sure he read it and said, `Oh, there's
17	my friends there saying good luck.'
18	It's just amazing, and then of
19	course, he gets inaugurated and they get a
20	free inauguration in the Metropolitan
21	Museum of Art in the Temple of (inaudible)
22	as gods.
23	Here I am, trying to honor the
24	African-American who called the Big Apple,
25	they don't respond. I get nothing, and

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2	they get a temple for free, and I says,
3	`How much would a temple cost an average
4	person,' if I wanted to have my wedding
5	there I just got married by the way
6	if I wanted to have my wedding there, how
7	much would it be?
8	They said \$60,000. How much do you
9	charge them?
10	Nothing, and that's how non-profits
11	get into the system. And then of course,
12	then my City Councilmember Dan Garodnick,
13	who didn't respond to me on the Big
14	Apple he's on the Cultural Affairs
15	Committee, by the way, which I wanted him
16	to do something; he didn't respond to me
17	he goes to The Temple Dendara saying we
18	pledged to serve the community to be
19	whatever, and they don't respond, but
20	that's another story.
21	But who gives money to is that?
22	The UFT, of course, the developers
23	give again. They all get invited; they all
24	get seen, and to say that's nothing
25	Obviously, if you get \$250 or less,

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2	maybe you don't get invited to the
3	inauguration, if you give the maximum
4	first of all, that's matched four to one,
5	you get invited to the organization; that's
6	something; that's influence; that's
7	something; that's more than I ever got.
8	I never got responses. I don't even
9	get a response for a Community Board
10	application, but that's a lot. Again, I
11	suggest limiting to \$250. Also again I
12	disagree with Fran Reiter about the
13	influence, I think it's very important.
14	I agree with her on unions, that's
15	very, very, very big, that's where I stand
16	as a Republican, as opposed to Democrat,
17	although viewing is by everybody, and I
18	think it's a very, very serious problem.
19	Wal-Mart is an issue. We'll never
20	have a Wal-Mart in the City. I agree
21	she said, Wal-Mart can't spend enough money
22	to get into the City, but that's a problem,
23	because most people probably want to shop
24	at Wal-Mart; most probably want lower

prices; most people, maybe they care about

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2	that work for Wal-mart, but they want to
3	shop at a store that has low prices.
4	Andbut Wal-Mart will never get
5	into the City, because of the union money,
6	because of the large union money, a
7	tremendous amount of union money, and if
8	\$250 is the limit not only for people, not
9	only for the developers but for unions as
10	well, I think that makes sense. That's all
11	I want to say thank you very much for your
12	time.
13	MR SCHWARTZ: Thank you for coming
14	again, I'm sorry we didn't get to you more
15	quickly, but the other people were already
16	on the schedule. Okay, so I guess we're
17	now adjourned.
18	(Time Noted: 12:25 p.m.)
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	C E R T I F I C A T E
3	STATE OF NEW YORK)
4) ss.: COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
5	·
6	I, SABINE FAUSTIN, a Shorthand
7	Reporter and Notary Public within and
8	for the State of New York, do hereby
9	certify:
10	That I reported the proceedings in
	the within-entitled matter, and that the
11	within transcript is a true record of
12	such proceedings.
13	I further certify that I am not
14	related, by blood or marriage, to any of
15	
16	the parties in this matter and that I am
17	in no way interested in the outcome of
18	this matter.
19	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
20	set my hand thisday of,
21	2006.
22	SABINE FAUSTIN
23	
24	